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Chairperson: Dr. William Kornegay
This study describes and analyzes the social, political,
and organizational dynamics involved in the creation and
development of selected post-secondary education programs
identified as non-tradit ional
.
These programs are categorized by two basic models:
the institutional based (i.e., the innovation as a sub-
system of a larger, parent institution) and the community-
based (i.e., the innovation which is oriented to a community
or constituency rather than closely affiliated with any ex-
isting institution).
Initially, an overview of the more prevalent institu-
tional model is presented through a brief description of
the development of the University Without Walls (UWW) with
emphasis given to the implications of its affiliation with
the University of Massachusetts. UWW's tenuous organiza-
tional history is seen as characteristic of most new pro-
grams conceived and nurtured in a larger institutional con-
text. Through an in-depth case study, the Community College
of Vermont (CCV) is seen, in contrast, as an example of a
viable educational innovation spawned outside of any ex-
isting institution.
The complex interplay of personalities and events
critical to the program's development are explicated through
an open-ended quest ionnaire administered personally to nine-
teen selected individuals who have been, or continue to be,
l<;ey figures in the creation and development of the Community
College of Vermont. The study also examines the organiza-
tional strategies and individual styles utilized to arrive
v
at intended goals, and suggests approaches for use in fu-
ture efforts lor the benefit of those who are engaged in
the planning and implementation of similar programs.
The general conclusions of the study are summarized
as follows:
1. The cases analyzed reinforce the literature which
suggests that the achievement of significant educational
innovation is more likely to take place on the periphery
of higher education (i.e., in community or non-institut ional
settings) rather than in colleges and universities themselves.
While the University Without Walls was ultimately constrained
by the institution of which it was a part, the Community
College of Vermont was able to establish for itself a unique
role distinct from the prevailing system of higher educa-
tion surrounding it.
2. This study has also emphasized that the acceptance
of innovation is an inherently political process. In the
case of CCV, its success can be attributed to the following
factors: Its conceivers possessed both conceptual clarity
as well as competency to implement their ideas; they main-
tained contact with the political environment; they de-
veloped effective systems for acquiring and utilizing data;
CCV demonstrated at least as much accountability as did
more traditional institutions; and it was both eclectic and
selective in its development.
3. No one element emerges as entirely sufficient by
itself to ensure implementation of a viable educational
reform; an entire network of related factors must be pre-
sent in sufficient number to ensure some likelihood of
success. In particular, appropriate organizational mecha-
nisms must accompany individual activist attitudes if real
change is to occur.
4. Innovation, like growth, can become its own object,
without form, direction, or plan; and an organization s
vague goals can assume a causality of their own. The
usual result of this process, once intensified, is that
vi
the innovation begins, at times unconsciously, to assume
the same character as that of the larger system from which
it seeks to distinguish itself.
5. Colleges and universities, as well as other edu-
cational institutions
,
must reduce the discrepency be-
tween what they say they are doing and what they actually
are doing. Educational institutions that aspire to safe
and effortless change to avoid potential conflicts do not
distinguish themselves as instruments of reform.
6. A choice exists for those who wish to effect change
temporary educational experimentation from within existing
institutions or deliberate movement toward more permanent
changes along the borders of our institutions where there
may be higher gains and there always are higher risks.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the past dozen years, the response of
higher education to the challenge for reform and rele-
vance has accelerated to an almost desperate pace. In
particular, we have seen the emergence of a more varied
student population requiring a more creative and effec-
tive utilization of diminishing resources. The result
has been a continuing proliferation of innovative edu-
cation programs in competition with more traditional
academic enterprises.
The idealism reflected in calls and promises for
greater institutional commitment to educational change
demands more than good intentions; also needed is imag-
ination and insight into the actual means by which pur-
poseful change takes place. Unfortunately, this gap be-
tween intention and implementation has not yet been ef-
fectively bridged. As a consequence, ambitious goals
are hampered by a lack of knowledge of the social, eco-
nomic, and political dynamics involved as well as an
absence of skills adequate to the tasks at hand.
There is a noticeable penchant to proceed ahis-
torically with so-called innovative programs, to attempt
to succeed where others have failed without examining
factors related to that failure. There is also a reluc-
tance to chronicle progress (or lack of it) in any sys-
tematic way. As a result, we find few, if indeed any,
reliable models for translating innovative ideas into
sound practice. And, in many instances, it is not dif-
ficult to discern a marked discrepency between what people
say they are doing or intend to do and what they actually
are doing or ultimately end up doing.
2
In short, the rhetoric and the reality of innova-
tive higher education are often two entirely different
things. Frequently, this is so because decisions af-
fecting the future of educational ventures are made on
the basis of how institutions can survive, rather than
on what is good educational policy. There is, in fact,
an inherent tendency for virtually every organization to
negotiate some compromise between its original plans and
purposes, and the ultimate need for individual satisfac-
tion and institutional stability. Thus, the rhetoric of
innovation finds itself forced to accommodate social,
political, and economic realities which may or may not
have been taken into account during the initial planning
stages
.
Purpose of Study
This study is an attempt to describe and analyze
the social, political, and organizational dynamics in- \
volved. in the creation and development of selected post-
secondary education programs identified as innovative or
non-traditional in nature. Initially, I propose two models
for educational innovation which I view as critical dis-
tinctions: one which is an institutionally-based model;
the other is community-based. I then offer some concep-
tual tools and technical skills useful in analyzing each
of these models. In doing this, I have chosen to examine
organizational strategies and individual styles utilized
to arrive at intended goals, to consider alternative ap-
proaches to educational innovation, and to derive insights
and implications for future efforts for the benefit of
those who are engaged in the planning and implementation
of similar programs.
This analysis of educational innovation places
emphasis upon selected identifiable factors which affect
change. Particular areas of inquiry include: (1) The
discrepancy between what was originally conceived and what
is ultimately implemented; (2) individual and organizational
behavior through the evolution of planned change efforts;
(3) the creation and maintenance of structures, processes,
and settings suitable for successful innovation; (A) the
dynamics of power and conflict, leadership, and decision-
making; and (5) the communication of change-oriented goals
to individuals, organizations, and communities.
Methodology
I was guided by a broad socio-historical perspec-
tive in studying the character of these programs to under-
stand their beginnings, and in analyzing the conditions
under which they assumed a particular orientation. This
approach enabled me to acquire insights into relationships
which underlie surface events, and to examine the conse-
quences of their actions and reactions to their social and
political environment.
Following a general introduction to the social and
organizational issues with which this study is concerned,
I review related literature; identify selected educational
innovations for purposes of illustration and analysis; and
finally pose questions for further inquiry. An organiza-
tional profile of an existing educational innovation (The
University Without Walls), planned and implemented within
a traditional institutional setting (the University of
Massachusetts), will be initially presented. In briefly
tracing its development, The University Without Walls (UWW)
is seen as the archtypical innovation whose tenuous or-
ganizational history is characteristic of most new pro-
grams conceived and nurtured in a larger institutional
context. The Community College of Vermont is, in contrast,
an example of an educational community spawned outside of
any existing institution. It is to this latter program
that we focus our attention for a more thorough organiza-
tional analysis.
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The contact I have developed with these programs and
the methods utilized in recording and analyzing that inter-
action may be seen as "personal knowledge as social science,"
a term Warren Bennis uses to describe his writings on various
educational institutions with which he has been connected.
Bennis points out that
,
while the public sees only the prod-
uct of organizational activity, it remains for the partici-
pant-observer to discern the details of the processes be-
hind formal actions, and from these arrive at certain laws
of bureaucracy that education shares with other institu-
tions. He also maintains that disciplined reflection on
one's personal involvement is a legitimate process of in-
quiry for the social sciences. 1
The case study of The Community College of Vermont,
to some extent, is patterned after the techniques of socio-
• • 2
analysis utilized by Riesman and Jencks. In looking at
the structures and processes of complex educational insti-
tutions, the trained observer can construct an impression-
istic case history. Guided by theoretical models, insight
can be acquired into the relationships that underlie sur-
face events, working hypotheses can be established as
stimuli and avenues to further ideas and understanding
which, when synthesized, can derive a complete picture of
an institution, its structures, norms, and processes. v
In like manner, Victor Baldridge, in his analysis of New
York University, employs a variety of techniques (inter-
views, questionnaires, documentary history, observation)
which achieve a "feel" for the situation which encompasses
^Warren Bennis, The Leaning Ivory Tower, (San Fran-
cisco, 1973) , P* 5-
^For a discussion of this technique see Nevit San-
ford, The American College (New York, 1962), p. 8.
^This combination of research techniques aimed at
gaining a picture of developmental processes through the
examination of critical events is referred by Jules Henry
as "natural history" in Culture Against Man , (New York,
1965), PP- 322-88.
5intangible, dynamic processes which afford new perspec
tives applicable to a variety of parallel situations, rather
than demonstrate proof in only one. ^
Several techniques have been utilized to conduct re-
search useful to the project: Initially, a variety of docu-
ments were reviewed, some for general background material,
others for more specific reference. This included early
concept papers, funding proposals, research and evaluation
studies, literature prepared for public consumption, and
miscellaneous other pieces for internal and external use.
A second technique used was an open-ended questionnaire
administered personally to nineteen selected individuals
who have been, or continue to be, key figures in the crea-
tion and development of the Community College of Vermont.
Their responses reflect a range of roles, perceptions, and
analyses. Finally, some time was spent in on-site observa-
tion, visiting the central offices, regional sites, attending
classes and meetings to develop a "feel" for the social and
organizational climate, and what occurs within it. (All
of these techniques were also used, with the exception of
interviews, in the discussion of The University Without
Walls.)
Finally, I have reflected upon the science (or art)
of planning, implementing, and managing change within in-
stitutional and community settings; I offer some general
recommendations which may be helpful to future innovators;
and share tentative judgements about major issues identified
in this study which require continued investigation; e.g.,
can conditions conducive to intentional change be engineered?
Is innovation capable of timely renovation? What are some
future implications for individuals, organizations, and
communities engaged in this phenomenon we call innovative
education?
^Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the Univer-
sity (New York, 1971 ) •
Limitations of Study
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It should be made clear that no effort has been made
to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the educational
programs to which I refer; nor have I attempted to measure
any cognitive variables of students, or compared the rela-
tive merits of one program with the other. (It is ques-
tionable whether there are, in fact, any reliable stan-
dards or indices for evaluating non-traditional
,
or for
that matter, traditional education practices.) The con-
cern of this study is more with processes, and less with
product, and as such, deals with analyses of data which
does not lend itself to quantifiable results or to infal-
lible truths.
Another point to mention is that of typicality; i.e.,
are the programs considered in this study representative of
other similar organizations, and can conclusions be gener-
alized to other situations? The potential variables are
sufficiently great in number and complexity that substan-
tially different outcomes could occur in other cases. In
any event, the case study method is not intended to prove
anything, but rather to examine, illustrate, instruct, and
offer useful perspective.
Organization of Study
Following the introductory chapter which indicates
the purpose of the study, its methodology, and its limita-
tions, chapter two offers a review of literature useful to
the study. Included here are comments on works concerned
with educational reform, organizational behavior, and the
diffusion of knowledge. Chapter three contains sociological
and organizational concepts which offer perspectives on the
development of educational innovations; issues discussed
include higher education and social change, social roles
7
for higher education, conflict in educational innovation,
goals in educational innovation, decision-making, and
leadership
.
Next, in chapter four, innovative education programs
are categorized into two basic models: the institution—
based (i»e>, the innovation as a sub— system of a larger,
parent institution) and the community-based (i.e., the
innovation which is oriented to a community or constituency
rather than closely affiliated with any existing institu-
tion). Initially, an overview of the more prevalent in-
stitutional model is presented through a brief descrip-
tion of the development of The University Without Walls
with emphasis given to the implications of its affiliation
with the University of Massachusetts.
An in-depth case study of a community-based model
(the Community College of Vermont) forms the nucleus of
the study. The complex interplay of social and organiza-
tional variables seen as critical to the program's develop-
ment are explicated by the case study. This approach also
allows the study to focus on organizational processes, prob-
lems, and patterns, rather than the worth or need of such
innovations
.
The concluding chapter explores the theoretical and
pragmatic implications of the case study, elicits central
themes of the social and organizational development of the
College, and attempts to identify critical issues and rele-
vant questions useful to the further study of innovation
in other settings.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Th e study of literature usefu l to thi,s_study ha s led
me
_
away from some of th e more conventional analyses of or-
ganizational behaviaiL...and management in business
,
industry
,
and government t.Q. more provocative
,
interdisciplinary ap
—
proac h_es app Ijicab la. t q the functions of educational change .
One focus has been essays on educational reform contained
in anthologies such as Matthew Miles' Innovation in Edu-
cation and Nevit Sanford's The American College
, comple-
mented by documents of the Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education and the Newman Report on Higher Education .
A second area of attention has been organizational
behavior and development. Especially helpful here has been
Martin Duberman's social history of Black Mountain with its
focus upon individual personalities and the collective quest
for an educational community; and psychologist Seymour Sara-
son's studies of The Creation of a Community Setting
,
which
offers concepts for analyzing situations in which people
come together in new relationships over sustained periods
of time to achieve certain goals. A more specific appli-
cation of organizational behavior and decision-making to
an academic setting is found in Victor Baldridge's Power
and Conflict in the University .
A third area of investigation has been the diffusion
and communication of new educational ideas and practices.
Existing literature generally focuses on innovations in
health and agriculture, as in Shoemaker and Rogers' Com-
munication of Innovations , but many generalities have
relevant application to education. Beyond the Stable State
by Donald Schon contributes several models for. the manage-
ment and dissemination of new learning in a rapidly changing
8
9
society, and the ways in which new ideas gain public ac-
ceptance. Peter Marris and Martin Rein point out the Di-
lemmas of Social Reform
, through a provocative discussion
of the difficultues of the Great Society programs of the
1960s
.
A variety of other sources have been reviewed, in-
cluding shorter recent essays contained in educational
journals
;
but this brief summary of the literature will
be limited primarily to those works cited above which have
been particularly useful. Many additional sources will,
of course, be referred to throughout other sections of this
study
.
Reform in Higher Education
For almost three decades, commissions and task forces
have been established for the purpose of examining contem-
porary issues facing higher education in America and offering
suggestions for relevant action and/or reform. The theme
of these long-awaited and highly-touted reports has been
that higher education is reasonably healthy, but that rapid
changes and new needs inevitably demand more effective and
creative use of resources.
There are as many critics of these reports as there
are critics of higher education. Some argue that no com-
mission has effectively addressed itself to the educational
process itself, but have preferred instead to look more
closely at structures and financing, power and control,
and other related political and economic issues impinging
upon higher education. These critics claim that the basic
questions inherent in education are being ignored and that
there is a shift away from concern for the ultimate pur-
poses of education.
The idealism and faith reflected in these various
challenges for increased creativity and commitment to
dealing with processes and structures in higher education
10
is appealing but not altogether convincing. What appears
to be lacking is any real insight into the actual means by
which recommended action should take place. Little thought
seems to be directed toward bridging the gap between good
intentions and effective implementation. Ideas do not
automatically become translated into action by virtue of
their newness or nobility.
With the recent proliferation of case studies at-
tempting to examine and analyze the application of social
science concepts and techniques to community and institu-
tional settings, a large number of generalizations regarding
the phenomenon of planned change have emerged. Yet, these
have not resulted in many truly useful insights as to pre-
cisely how intended changes actually come about. Efforts
to develop convincing change models for future application
usually results in rather obvious principles about events
and actions arrived at with the benefit of hindsight and
resulting as much from intuition as any systematically ap-
plied formula. In any case, such change studies present
scant evidence that any community and its institutions can
easily accommodate planned change programs, and it seems
as if most program innovators do little to improve upon
the unimpressive record to date.
Nevit Sanford observes that practice in higher edu-
cation, like politics, remains largely untouched by the
principles of social science even as our educational in-
stitutions tend to be governed by social tradition or
improvised in the face of political pressures. He makes
a case for the value of social and psychological theory
as a basis for, and a guide to, research on the educa-
tional process and their application to educational prob-
lems as a means of contributing to a more sophisticated
understanding of how human and organizational behavior
can be modified.
''’Sanford, The American College , p. 25.
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Hs finds particularly useful the "impressionistic"
approach of Riesman and Jencks in which they utilize se-
lected theoretical models, analogies, and generalizations
to synthesize into some formula a diversity of events and
processes and the relationships among these. Such impres-
sionistic studies can serve as working hypotheses to or-
ganize ideas and stimulate new directions and modes of in-
quiry. Of course, such a socio-analyt ic approach must
rely upon much intuition and good sense. Sanford argues,
in fact, that past educational research has not been suf-
ficiently abstract to encourage comparative institutional
studies; hence, processes identified in one institution
have not been related or added to our knowledge of the
functioning of institutions in general. He calls for an
increased effort to develop theory pertaining to the struc-
ture and functioning of institutions vis-a-vis their social
environment
,
2
In his comprehensive volume of essays on Innovation
in Education
,
Matthew Miles asserts that most innovations
are ephemeral ways of patching and otherwise tinkering
with old mechanisms to make them more tolerable. Miles
recognizes that innovations are talked about and admired,
but seldom copied; instead, new efforts are attempted ahis-
torically as if they were unique approaches to a unique
problem. He is especially aware of the recurring phenomenon
of innovations not ultimately being incorporated as originally
envisioned, and asks what determines this and what kinds
of revisions are typically made.
Much of Miles' effort is directed at discussing the
rates of change, its adoption, and the conditions which af-
fect these events. He recognizes no single factor, in and
of itself, as being highly related to adaptability and ob-
serves that the rate of diffusion of complex innovations
appears to be the same as for more simple innovations. He
2Ibid., p. 8ff.
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also notes that different communities vary in the degree
to which they adopt innovations, and a community that
pioneers in one area is likely to in another. 5 Since
there is a tendency for systems to maintain a status quo,
the major impetus comes from the outside; whenever changes
do occur, a sub-system tends to revert to its original
state Temporary structures which operate within and be-
twe^s permanent organizations (e.g., task forces) are seen
as a prime mechanism for bringing about innovation in per-
Zl
manent systems.
Miles maintains that change is the only constant
within systems and that increased sophistication is needed
in its management. He utilizes cases and examples not so
much to prove any assertions made, but to illustrate and
clarify the dynamics of change by showing the presence of
certain regularities. He identifies, for example, certain
pressures for internal change which are fairly typical for
most educational systems: growth and size; discrepencies
between ideals and existing practices; conflict among sub-
systems; scarce resources; and concern for innovation. All
of these can form some adaptation from what currently exists.
Effective innovative enterprises usually require phy-
sical and social isolation, yet thrive on intellectual and
professional connections with the surrounding context for
reinforcement and survival. Often, however, innovative
projects tend to become alienated from the surrounding en-
vironment, and the environment of the innovating group can
exert more power than the project itself. Lacking the
power to cause change directly, they develop substitute
satisfactions, as did the Black Mountain group.
Black Mountain as seen by Martin Duberman was a
vision of a community of learners guided by a respect for
3
„. Miles (ed.), Innovation in Education (New York,
1964), p. 321ff.
^Ibid.
,
p. 432.
,
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onesty and expression and a pragmatic concern for a liberal
education. Efficiency and structure were not held in high
esteem and were, in fact, seen as deterrents to the spon-
taneous creativity that was such a premium for success
there, but which resulted in a chronic tension which per-
sisted. Despite its progressive rhetoric, Black Mountain's
educational philosophy was confused, its founding principles
constantly disputed, and its procedures based upon random
impulses, according to Duberman. The interpersonal dyna-
mics were so intense as to be ultimately dysfunctional as
relationships gained primacy over the essential purposes
of the institution. From the disparate forces which made
up the Black Mountain experience, no suitable vehicles
emerged for translating intentions into practice. Superi-
ority of ends could not compensate for the inferiority of
means
.
The early phases of the Black Mountain setting were
typically infused with hope, enthusiasm, sense of mission,
and unity; gradually, it lost its spirit and purpose. Each
person who touched the place, in attempting to create and
contribute something in his own fashion, was more of an
obstacle than any external force. As an institution born
in revolt, it could not develop a positive, unifying, and
sustaining goal. Thus, it flourished briefly and expired.
In the final analysis, it was probably its fierce, uncom-
promising desire to be a community, not merely a college,
that brought its dissolution. Never having clearly defined
itself, not rooted in the landscape of any place, or any-
thing before it, Black Mountain may well have been an ana-
chronism which, ironically enough, has gained some enduring
and romantic historical permanence.
Burton Clark sees that colleges, like all organiza-
tions, have a social role. Some seize that role in a pur-
poseful way that we can call a mission. Among these, some
are able to develop and sustain this mission over time; the
mission is then transformed into what Clark terms an "embracing
14
sapra." "The organization with a saga is only secondarily
a social entity characterized by plan and reason. It is,
first of all, a matter of the heart, a center of personal
and collective reality ." 1 It is perhaps this quality
which distinguishes Black Mountain from its contemporaries
and most of its successors.
Organizational Behavior and Change
Richard Schmuck and Matthew Miles review the origins
of current reforms in Organizational Development in Schools
.
They contend that most attempts at educational reform have
collapsed or have had no effect because of the limited at-
tention given to the organizational context in which re-
forms are tried. ^ The literature on planned change has
gradually turned to_ a consideration of human factors, iden-
tifying strategies to improve organizations which range
from rationale to re-educative to coercive models. While
some proposals call for holistic change, most have been
piecemeal and limited in scope.
Organizational development (i.e., planned, sustained
efforts to apply behavioral science for system improvement)
is advocated by Schmuck and Miles as a way to combat orga-
nizational pathologies in schools and elsewhere. While they
feel it may take two or three years to effect significant,
self-sustaining change, they agree it is possible to mini-
mize paranoia, mistrust, alienation, powerlessness, and
repressive management through systematic attention to ade-
quate communication, integration of individual and organi-
zational goals, development of a climate of trust in deci-
sion-making, and the improvement of morale via reward sys-
tems .
^Burton Clark, The Distinctive College (Chicago,
1970), p. 9.
f)
R. Schmuck and M. Miles, Organizational Development
in Schools (Palo Alto, 1971), PP- 1-5.
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The authors are particularly interested, in the dyna-
mics of educational change because they see schools, per-
haps more than other organizations, suffer from ambiguity
and diversity of goals and from formal controls which in-
duce pressures toward the "processing of cohorts" rather
than individualizing teaching and learning. They appear
to place great faith in the potential role of organizational
development to reverse the dismal record of innovation with-
in educational organizations.
Barry Richman and Richard Farmer, in their book Leader-
ship, Goals, and Power in Higher Education
,
describe the
real world of complex decision-making
,
not the theoretical
one of "perfect
;
justice, truth, and brotherhood." They
utilize an "open-systems" approach wherein organization
and management are conceptualized as continuously trans-
forming systems, in which there is dynamic transaction with
the external environment. As such, there is always, in an
open system, an element of uncertainty with typically many
external political, social, and economic variables whose
impact upon institutions and their management must be ex-
amined .
This multivariate nature of organizational systems
demands the contingencies available through an open-systems
approach in which differing management practices and or-
ganizational designs are considered most appropriate for
specific situations and varying conditions. While Rich-
man and Farmer recognize the importance of improving in-
ternal efficiency, they consider the key task of effective
management to be to define, articulate, operationalize,
and implement relevant, realistic, and attainable goalo
and priorities. This must be done while considering and
accommodating what the outside world wants, needs, and ex-
pects; what internal constituencies want, need, and expect;
and what the institution itself is capable ol delivering
with the resources available. This process requires know-
ledge of what an organization's goals are as well
as
16
agreement as to what future goals should be. As they put
it, "You cannot get there from here if both here and there
are undefined."''
7
The authors review several basic models of academic
governance and decide upon one resembling "organized
anarchy" as being the most prevalent in institutions of
higher education. In this model, the university hardly
resembles idealized notions of itself; instead, it re-
flects ambiguity of purpose, has problematic goals if in-
deed it has any at all, lacks ability to learn from experi-
ence, and exhibits an ambiguous power structure. Richman
and Farmer advocate more adequate predictive and prescrip-
tive theories of organization and management. An open-
systems approach does not guarantee any educational utopia,
but it does recognize that promoting scholarship and dis-
covering truth do require an institution's political in-
volvement and then the institution cannot remain uncon-
taminated by money, accountability, efficiency, and manage-
ment .
Victor Baldridge's Power and Conflict in the Univer-
sity analyzes the dynamic processes which occur within and
between formal organizational structures. He avoids
descriptions of static institutional arrangements which
do not reveal much about the organization in action, its
changes over time, the interfaces between its sub-systems,
and the processes by which policy is established and de-
cisions made. For this bureaucratic model he substitutes
a more appropriate political one.
What Baldridge does is to apply conflict theory to
a university setting in order to stress the political
dynamics that lead to the formulation of policy. His
?B. Richman and R. Farmer, Leadership, Goals, and.
Power in Higher Education (San Francisco, 1^/4), p. 67 -
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analysis focuses on: (1) the organization's social struc-
ture, its groups and its settings; (2) interest articula-
tion: how groups translate goals into effective influence;
(3) legislative processes and the execution of policy.
8
In this way, Baldridge is able to capture a holistic
picture of an institution and its dynamics. He develops
a case study of New York University, showing how its plans
were constantly shaped by its social-political context,
and by pressures from numerous sources. It is an effec-
tive expose of polite, but deadly, warfare in an intellec-
tual kingdom fractured into tiny feudal provinces.
Warren Bennis and Philip Slater discuss the inter-
action of individuals and organizations in The Temporary
Society . They see the modern organization as extremely
vulnerable to identity crises because rapid growth and
change distort its original, more simplified goals. This
is especially so for the knowledge industry, which they
predict will grow rapidly in the second half of this cen-
Q ' ...
tury. They maintain that a democratic organization is
the most compatible with perpetual change, although the
university is stubbornly resistant to democratization.
Adaptive, changing, temporary systems will be especially
appropriate during a time of chronic change. Problems
will have to be solved by strangers with diverse skills
who are motivated by the task itself, not by personal at-
tachments. This will require managers to achieve an ap-
propriate mix of people, competencies, and tasks for am-
biguous, unstructured situations. Temporary systems will
often require adaptive processes and adjustment to social
strain and psychological tensions. People, in short, must
be as interchangeable as possible from one organization to
the next
.
8Baldridge
,
Power and Conflict in the Unive rsity
,
pp. 19-26.
9W. Bennis and P. Slater, The Temporary Society;
(New York, 1968), p. 6B.
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Mobility and change will virtually rule out any ef-
fective system of social control and will require total com-
mitment to an organization over a relatively short time.
The danger here is that the more demands that are placed up-
on a relationship, the more likely it is to fall short of
expectations. Creating stability and continuity amid change
requires that the organization take conscious responsibility
for controlling its destiny and evolution
; without a planned
methodology and explicit direction, the enterprise will not
reach its potential.
Planning for Social and Educational Reform
Seymour Sarason is concerned with the processes and
problems of creating and sustaining change in community
contexts. He observes, in The Creation of Settings
,
10
that
most utopian literature conveniently by-passes the realities
of creating settings and much literature tends to explain
phenomena in terms of motivation or personality. The de-
cision to create something new usually reflects an opinion
that existing procedures are inadequate and a sense of mis-
sion is felt to produce a setting that will perform more ef-
fectively.
But consensual agreement on vague new values is in-
adequate in developing viable new settings; values are
necessary, but not sufficient. Settings are created as if
they will work as planned with no provision for change and
thus are inherently weak in anticipating problems and con-
sequences. The result is often initial optimism being re-
placed by pessimism and consensus overcome by polarization.
The consensus of values, in short, does not instruct in how
to create successful settings.
also Seymour Sarason, The Creation oi a Com -
munitv Setting (Syracuse, 19?l). Sarason defines a setting
as a situation in which people and resources are brought to-
gether in a new relationship for sustaining periods of time
to accomplish stated objectives.
Sarason suggests that our own way of thinking about
what we wish to create may be as much an obstacle as ex-
ternal hostility or indifference. Settings may be created
with vague concepts in the absence of vehicles for trans-
mitting intentions into practice. We are reminded that
to do good for others requires knowledge and experience;
when this is lacking, the group's functions and relation-
ships gain primacy over the clarity of values and skill
in operationalizing them. In most organizational settings,
Sarason finds maneuvers, alliances, and conflicts which
absorb its participants, and organizational purposes which
are easily distorted to meet individual needs. While no
organization wants to self-destruct, there are usually
ample warning signals that problems exist. Unfortunately,
these are often ignored, not because problems aren't rec-
ognized or can't be solved, but because individuals re-
fuse to see them and instead rationalize them as virtues
or necessities.
In the creation of settings, there usually exists a
very small number of ideas, convictions, or experiences
which dominate thinking and action. A common failing,
Sarason points out, is not to consider the universe of al-
ternatives in the zeal to improve upon what exists. A
related weakness is to overlook the prehistory of each
setting which predates the current effort. Any setting
is rooted in a local social history which is invariably
reflected in the style and thinking of any new effort.
Sarason repeatedly stresses the complex array of con-
ceptual, personal, and environmental problems which pre-
vail in the creation of settings and the lack of useful
guidelines to follow. The haphazard, unreflective way
in which so many persons engage in the creation of set-
tings is chronicled in the high incidence of failures,
despite all good intentions.
20
He hypothesizes that the "social soil" in which an
innovation is to develop and grow must already contain
some fertilizing ingredient. If the social-historical
heritage in which the innovation is to be imbedded cannot
tolerate a break from what was traditionally in that set-
ting, then it is not likely that the new element will be
nurtured to fruition. 11 It is this existing structure or
culture of a setting which defines the permissible ways
in which the problem of change can be approached.
Those who introduce change presumably do so with
certain assumptions that the change is desirable for its
recipients and the intended outcomes are clear to those
seeking change. The literature on planned change tells
us little about how to prioritize changes and predict out-
comes, and what the relationship is between outcomes and the
processes of change leading to them. Sarason cautions us
that familiarity with a setting may have no intrinsic re-
lationship to one's understanding of the change process.
Sarason cryptically sums up his views of schools and
change by stating that efforts to date to introduce sub-
stantive change, particularly in education where simple
solutions are viewed as ends which, when reached in some
mystical way, will change the quality of life. Such ef-
forts, contends Sarason, only result in the illusion of
change
.
Peter Marris and Richard Rein, in their book Dilemmas
of Social Reform , present an analysis of urban community
action programs in the 1960s. They conclude that, in its
first five years of operation, the anti-poverty effort
failed to realize its ideals of raising the power of the
poor. Nonetheless, they feel that it did develop a range
of skills and models of action which stimulated a realign-
ment of resources and ideas toward a variety of reform
initiatives. They see the chief innovations of this
11 Ibid., p. 9
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movement to be the creation of the professional reformer
and the invention of an organizational framework appropriate
to his tasks.
What is, in fact, the task of the social reformer
and what guides his thinking and action? Marris and Rein
describe him as one who operates on faith in a creative
imbalance; someone who seeks to upset the prevailing social
balance, sets processes moving again with new arrangements,
and keeps them from once again coming to rest. The reformer,
while influential in initiating new social policies, may not
be able to control his execution and must, therefore, shift
the emphasis of his intervention as the thrust of any one
idea begins to lose its momentum. The emerging acceptance
of a new idea is itself a sign that it is time for still
newer reforms to be insinuated into the new status quo.
Thus, the reformer intervenes by exploiting what is novel
and fashionable to disrupt whatever equilibrium seems to
menace the vitality of imbalance.
To overcome inertia and dramatize its own necessity,
Marris and Rein observe that reform seems to proceed most
effectively when issues become polarized. The reformer
then sides with the less prevailing order and that which
most disrupts the existing equilibrium. The direction of
social reform thus tends to be circular, continually re-
dressing the balance, and institutionalizing new interpre-
15tat ions of reoccurring needs. Each new slogan contains
all that went before but with new emphases and nuances
which appeal to the moment.
Marris and Rein conclude their assessment of Ameri-
can social reform in the 1960s by suggesting that a society
which tolerates criticism and innovation is forced to inte-
grate and compromise a great variety of ideals and interests
^Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social
Reform (New York, 1967) > P- 254.
15Ibid
.
,
p . 256
.
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competing for expression and, thus, can fully satisfy none.
The more widely the freedom to initiate change is spread,
the more difficult it becomes to control and integrate the
outcomes. New lines of action are propogated without any
viable mechanisms for implementation. Society validates
certain ideas to justify a policy, while other useful ideas
are disparaged or discarded. Innovation becomes more dif-
fuse, and each reform represents an extreme choice between
competing ideologies.
Their study is a provocative analysis of the content
and techniques of social reform. Characteristic of any
movement toward social reform is the fundamental struggle
to reconcile the conflict of contending ideals and inter-
. 14
est s
.
As community action evolved, it continually shifted
its emphasis; policy tended to move in a circle, turning
from one alternative to another, as the drawbacks of each
became apparent. In this way, the program was trying to
rationalize the planning of policy through the insights
of social science, as well as devise new procedures of
political accommodation and, at the same time, move toward
a constructive outcome which would make it responsive to
the needs of those whom the policy was intended to serve.
But because these programs were trying to give form and
meaning to so many approaches at once, they were limited
15in the role they could play in each approach.
Social ideas, and the interpretation of social prob-
lems, often based on conventional wisdom, frequently be-
come fashionable before they are proven. These ideas gain
currency, are passed along, and adquire an authority which
may outlive their usefulness. Often the excitement pro-
voked by an experimental program's rhetoric is responsible
for the appearance of success. But unless a reform move-
ment can institutionalize its purposes, it adds nothing
14 15Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., pp. 226-8.
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to insight and experience. The process of social reform
only works if it leaves behind growing resources, and not
merely promising rhetoric.
The process of social reform may be conceived of in
two ways, according to Marris and Rein. According to one
conception, the process acts as a stimulus to invention
and provides a means of breaking out of established pat-
terns of service and administrative structures. It liber-
ates ideas rather than foresees their outcomes. In the
other conception of this process, social reform seeks to
create new structures that not merely introduce innovative
ideas, but structures that determine how these ideas are
to be integrated and applied in community and institutional
settings. In essence, the dichotomy between these two con-
cepts of social reform is the distinction between the de-
tached testing of experimental designs and theories on the
one hand, and the pursuit of a deliberate course of social
action on the other.
Warren Bennis also notes the gap between theory and
practice. He acknowledges the contribution of theories
that identify and explain the dynamic interaction of sys-
tems, but he detects a continued absence of applied theory
dealing with strategic leverages for altering systems.
As he puts it, "There are theories of change, but not
theories of changing." 1^ The prevailing assumption that
theoretical insights into change will automatically lead
to more effective functioning via the application of change
strategies is questionable. Exactly how does this insight
become transformed into actual manipulation of social fac-
tors? Bennis contends that action is not related to in-
sight because organizational change theorists resemble
17
astronomers in that they observe without control.
^Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York, 1966),
p. 99.
17Ibid.
,
p. 204.
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This production of new knowledge and ideas with only
limited application contributes little to our understanding
of how social processes stifle or facilitate change strate-
gies. Besides merely storing new learning, organizations
must put to use what they learn if they wish to revitalize
themselves, achieve autonomy, and determine their direc-
tion .
Planning, as it specifically relates to change-
oriented goals in higher education, is discussed by Er-
nest Palola and William Padgett in Planning for Self-
Renewal . They identify three variables which facilitate
planning for change: small size, being private, and new-
18
ness; they also identify a strong deterrent to change:
goal evasion (i.e., the inability or unwillingness of edu-
cators to define precisely their objectives and aims).
A key distinction is made between substantive—as
opposed to procedural—improvements, or macro vs micro
change. Merely altering operating procedures can be con-
sidered micro change; bringing about a major shift in an
organization's role and mission is macro change. The
authors recognize that most planning today in higher edu-
19
cation is concerned with micro change.
Planning for substantive or macro change, they argue,
involves more than the exploration of intriguing possi-
bilities; it involves making hard decisions among concrete
and often mutually exclusive alternatives. Theirs is a
no-nonesense approach to planning:
Planning is at least as much the domain of
politicians as it is of visionaries. And wide-
spread advocacy, expertise, and consensus are
more valuable to the process than the existence
of a few novel ideas . 20
18Ernest Palola and William Padgett, Planning for
Self-Renewal (Berkeley, 1971 )
,
P* ^1
•
12Ibid., p. 69.
20Ibid., p. 64.
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No planning effort, in short, can remove itself entirely
from the political implications of decision-making. They
assert that it is better to have a valid political solu-
tion to a problem than something that looks rational ac-
cording to a particular planning study.
Palola and Padgett conclude their work on a somewhat
pessimistic note, observing that the link between planning
and change is weak; when change does come, it is usually
unplanned, and precipitated by external forces. In the
final analysis, predictions of outcomes are vague; the
situation demands risk-taking and the availability of ven-
ture capital.
Diffusion and Application of Innovation
Donald Schon, in Beyond the Stable State
, believes
that we have gone beyond the state in which we can possess
a sense of constancy of our lives. We have reached a state
wherein established institutions are regarded as unstable,
social values are eroded, and belief in stability is il-
lusion. What is now needed, says Schon, to overcome the
inherent resistance to change exhibited by social systems,
which he labels "dynamic conservatism," is the development
of new institutional structures and an ethic for the pro-
21
cesses of change. Talk about change is as often as
not a substitute for engaging in it, but this resistance
is not from the stupidity of individuals within a system;
it is a function of the system itself.
Much of Schon' s discussion is concerned with the
process of public learning, i.e., how new problems come
to public attention and how policies become part of pub-
lic action. Ideas are slow to come into currency, but
once institutionalized, they are slow to fade away al-
though they no longer accurately reflect the current state
of affairs. Dynamically conservative systems protect them-
selves against ideas which cannot be brought to public
^Donald Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London,
1971), P- 32.
26
attention without disruptive consequences or perceived a
threatening to prevailing institutions. The means of self-
protection vary—ideas may be relegated to the margins of
society
,
they may be repressed, or disconnected from ac-
tion. Or the social system may tolerate ideas of these
kinds in insulated and isolated areas, where they may then
progress to public acceptance.
The process by which ideas are brought into currency,
visibility gained, constituencies built, support gathered
and policy developed—all this is ultimately a political
function. The dynamic conservatism to be encountered from
social systems which feel the threat of displacement must
be combated by any new program which must establish its
visibility, demonstrate its connection with the interests
of those powerful in decision-making, and gradually seek
a continuous, cumulative commitment which will culminate
in support
.
Schon maintains that if ideas are to become powerful
for change in policy, they must enter the field of com-
peting forces and stir up conflict. Thus the struggle of
ideas to gain acceptance has political as well as intel-
lectual dimensions; ideas must tap into the sources of
power and themselves become vehicles for gaining power.
While their approach is cross-cultural in nature and
their examples drawn largely from agricultural innovations,
Everett Rogers and Frank Shoemaker also offer several use-
ful concepts for understanding change in The Communication
of Innovations . They begin by stating that any analysis
of social change must ultimately center upon communication
processes. A particularly useful distinction is made re-
garding the role of mass media, which is important in
creating general public awareness and knowledge of new
ideas, and interpersonal channels (e.g., opinion leaders)
27
which are more important in changing individual attitudes.
leaders, oi course, can assume a positive or nega-
tive stance regarding any innovation; and, consequently,
ppcan promote or hinder change.
Questions to be Considered
While the literature on planned change increases, it
remains unimpressive in its contribution to a better under-
standing of the processes of change in higher education.
Much, of course, has been written on educational reform,
various commissions continue to issue reports, and our
revisionist historians are busy detailing the vices of
our vast educational enterprise. Yet, precisely how plans,
policies, and programs in higher education come about still
lacks analysis. Many fundamental questions remain unan-
swered with few clues offered for guidance as to how to
proceed. This study attempts to pose relevant questions
and offer some tentative responses.
Among the issues to be addressed are the following:
Must the original rhetoric or intent of an innovation
necessarily be compromised to gain acceptance? Can edu-
cational decisions be based upon policies and less on the
politics of survival? Can conditions or settings most
conducive to change be identified? Are there useful models
or vehicles for translating intentions into practice? Does
educational change most easily occur, if at all, from with-
in or outside dominant social, political, and organizational
systems? Under what conditions can the impetus for change
within an innovative enterprise be sustained? Are tem-
porary efforts at change effective?
^Everett Rogers and Frank Shoemaker , communication
of Innovations (New York, 1971), P*
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The literature considered in this study has obviously
encompassed readings outside the realm of higher education
in the hope that the additional sources would offer use-
ful perspective and relevant application in considering
these questions. Observations and ideas from these readings,
as well as from additional sources not specifically cited
in this section, will be integrated into the subseauent
descriptive and analytical sections.
CHAPTER HI
EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION: SOCIAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
The evolution of an innovation from idea to imple-
mentation is an uncertain process. Noble ideas may die
of loneliness and questionable schemes may come to frui-
tion. The process of creatine; and executing; many of the
"Great Society" programs of the 1960s, for example, was
one of frustration, adaptation, confusion, and conflict -
,
there are too many variables to explain why some programs
made it and some did not. While no two histories of in-
novation are ever exactly alike, we can, nonetheless,
draw themes from carefully chronicled experiences that
may offer some guidance for action in the future.
The Sociology of Innovation
Egon Guba has observed that most innovations are
based on research evidence and are thoroughly tested before
being made generally available to the public. vAt this
point, they are usually disseminated through institutional
channels (e.g., results of agricultural research diffused
via county extension agents). He maintains that this is
generally not true in education.^- Also, incentives . for
adoption of most innovations are economic -
,
while the eco-
nomic motive is not altogether eliminated in education,
it is replaced to a certain degree by more socially-based
motives. Guba characterizes change in education as not
being planned, evaluated, tested, or diffused through rec-
ognized institutional channels; change often reflects con-
fused strategies which are poorly defined, slowly dill used,
1Egon Guba, "Methodological Strategies of Educational
Change," paper presented to Conference on Strategies for
Educational Change, Washington, D.C. , November, 1969.
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dubiously motivated, and seldom evaluated for effective-
ness .
In the earnest desire to create more and better
academic Camelots, innovators may often become compulsive.
They devise elaborate solutions that are then in need of
an applicable problem. When new problems thrust themselves
forward unexpectedly, innovators are frequently reluctant
to consider alternative solutions because of their strong
ego involvement with pet solutions.
Ihose desirous of widespread changes (rhetorical
change) may actually be very frustrated with present prob-
lems and have a strong desire to by-pass them by turning
attention to the future. Alvin Eurich notes that change
Pg r £e has no value other than the excitement of breaking
away from the old, and for this only is not worth the ef-
2fort. Innovators promoting changes may forego gradual
and systematic measures which will result in more per-
manent reform. Warren Bennis advocates an incremental
reform model, one which allows time for gains to be con-
solidated, and for alternatives and consequences to be
z
weighed before decisions and actions are irrevocable.'
But, he goes on to comment that innovation can be a very
seductive force, and it can seem to assume a purpose all
its own irrespective of the ends for which change pro-
cesses have presumably been engineered.
Planning for effective change does not take place
easily, particularly within newer organizations in which
there persists an attitude that all decisions must be
consensual and that the processes must be a therapeutic
learning experience in which much time is spent in
^Alvin Eurich, Reforming American Education (New
York, 1969), P« 199
•
^Bennis, "The Sociology of Institutions," Psychology
Today
,
November 197d.
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ameliorating tensions. (See section on UWW i’or evidence of
this
.)
As organizations become more sophisticated and ac-
quire additional resources, they may incorporate a separate
planning/ pi ograin development component. The danger in this
is that if planning becomes too separated and differentiated
from management and production or service components, then
an idea can become isolated and never quite reach the im-
plementation stage. Also, new ideas usually reflect new
ways of doing things and are, thus, inherently controver-
sial because they may challenge existing organizational
arrangements and question the value of certain activities,
as well as the status and prestige of individuals who per-
form them. Managing the delicate process by which innova-
tion is introduced and moves through conflict to acceptance
requires talent and political astuteness. An organization's
willingness to compromise is an additional attribute which
allows for movement to a middle ground when necessary, en-
courages the clarification of innovations in operational
terms for managers, and makes it more possible for planners
to define the limits of what is possible without repeated
rebuffs
.
An organization with the means for compromise enables
the planner to feel the innovation really is, or can be,
different and, at the same time, lets the organization be
convinced that the proposed change is not sufficiently
different to be too disruptive of the status quo . Con-
ditions for rationalizat ion and negotiation of this sort
are a recognition that the process of organizat ional in-
novation is an inherently political process and, thus,
does not usually reflect rational models of problem solving
and decision-making.
Institutions that espouse educational change do not
necessarily practice it, for it is extremely difficult to
transform traditional institutions into anything approxi-
mating experimental institutions. Yet since about 1964-
,
nearly every college and university has sponsored at least
one project which it has labeled as innovative. It must
be seriously questioned whether there are, in fact, many
truly innovative programs in operation, or do we just see
more of the same under the guise of a different name.
That relatively little change in academic values,
practices, and policies has occurred during the era of
growth and expansion, was further documented by the Newman
Commission Report on Higher Education which stated in its
preface
:
The I higher education TL system, with its mas-
sive inertia and resistance to fundamental change,
rarely eliminates outmoded programs, ignores the
differing needs of students, seldom questions its
educational goals, and almost never creates new
and different types of institutions. 4
Other critics cite new areas of study, such as living-
learning complexes, and experient ially-based learning, but
complain that while institutions are constantly changing,
they do so without fully evaluating the consequences of
those changes.
But these innovations do not promote institutional
change because they are seldom introduced at the expense
of old programs. Lon Iiefferlin identifies three general
patterns of academic change; "...the creation of new in-
stitutions, the radical transformation of existing in-
stitutions, or the piecemeal alteration of institutional
programs." There are far fewer examples of the second
pattern (i.e., radical transformation of existing insti-
tutions) than of the other two approaches.
^Preface to Report on Higher Education , Task Force
on Higher Education (Frank Newman, Chairman), (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1971).
^Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform (San
Francisco, 1969 )
1
p. 22.
Samuel Baskin points out that the emphases of newer
institutions in education are eclectic, rather than based
upon any consistent theory or philosophy of change. This
is in contrast to the experimental colleges of the 1920s
with their affinity for Dewe.yan pragmatism and for Freudian
psychology. Many now colleges of the 1960s and '70s con-
veniently evade assuming any unifying theme by claiming
to synthesize the best of all preceding philosophies in
a modern context.
The danger of this potpourri of innovat iveness is
that it may include some less desirable traditional cha-
racteristics, as new people reinterpret innovation in terms
of familiar experiences. Changes are generally reached by
consensus and implemented with a minimum of risk; conse-
quently, the status quo is largely maintained, criticism
is absorbed, and life goes on as before, although those
involved may convince themselves that change is taking place.
Because of inst itutional preoccupation with financial matters,
the concern for replicability and the need to operate for
survival, those innovations which do take root are determined
not on their own merits, but rather by external con-
siderations which have little to do with education per se .
In describing his experiences at Fairhaven College,
Harris Wofford has written a thoughtful account of the
difficulty involved in arriving at a consensual view of
what a college ought to be when a diversity of opinions
is involved. Few at Fairhaven gave much forethought to
what should happen and no attempt was made to arrive at a
comprehensive picture to understand the present and plan
the future. Eventually, Fairhaven moved toward extremely
7
non-directed
,
nebulous, almost nihilistic education.
^Samuel Baskin, Newer Developments in Higher Edu -
cation (New York, 196 p"« 67
•
?Gary McDonald (ed.), Five Experimental Colleges
(New York, 1975).
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Robert Havighurst sees such endeavors as products of
uncommon life styles during unsettled times. He observes
that when free spirits come together to build a common
social and educational life for themselves, their im-
pulse toward individual freedom often conflicts with the
need for constraints imposed by communal ventures. This
tension between freedom and constraint, says Havighurst,
results in troubled existences for numerous experimental
effort s
David Riesman and Christopher Jencks point out that
almost every experimental college has eventually redefined
its goals or the distinctive means by which it initially
pursued them in such a way as to bring the institution
closer to the academic legitimacy as a matter of "con-
9solidating revolutions ." y But in the necessary struggle
for mere existence, can a revolution, in fact, occur with-
out some betrayal? Inevitably, an educational innovation
is likely to attract students and faculty who may not be
committed to the original vision. The true believers be-
come a minority and the more traditional norms of the aca-
demic profession reassert themselves. It remains to be
seen, even if they are unable to preserve their pristine
form, if these experimental colleges can have some subtle
impact upon more traditional institutions.
Paul Goodman reminds us that secession has usually
been the historical remedy for disaffected communities of
scholars, Black Mountain perhaps being the most notable ef-
fort at creating a separate educational community. But
these intentional communities must have resources avail-
able outside themselves. This is the dilemma faced by
those who want to transform a system or segment of society;
^Robert Havighurst, introduction to The Story of
Commonwealth College , by Raymond and Charlotte Koch (New
York, 1972;.
^Riesman and Jencks, The Academic Revolution (Garden
City, 1969), P. 502.
rather than withdraw from it or destroy it, they must func-
tion strategically within it. Goodman remained uncertain
as to whether such efforts at establishing social alterna-
tives can effect some profound change within the entire
system or if, in fact, they do very little to transform
the world in any real way.
At the heart of these educational experiments re-
sides a somewhat anarchistic faith that if only people
could be freed from structure and authority, a new and
better social order could be realized. It is a vision long
on earnestness, but short on practicality. It is a fuzzy,
romanticized philosophy of education which characterizes
much of the educational reform movement of the 1960s. It
reflects an idealized and somewhat simplistic attitude, but
one which Eric Hoffer suggests may be useful: to plunge head-
long into some bold change enterprise requires an extravagant
conception of the prospects and potentialities for the future
of the endeavor. Those involved must be ignorant of the dif-
ficulties involved in their undertaking and, in this sense,
experience is a handicap.'1" 0
Education and Social Change
Perhaps the most exaggerated claim of so-called in-
novative programs is their purported role as agents of social
change. This is not only a self-congratulatory exercise,
but one of self-deception as well. Most educational in-
stitutions are better equipped and more successful at fos-
tering individual changes, than systematic ones. New in-
stitutions may influence the social system if their methods
are adopted by other institutions. This does not happen
easily, of course, because institutions are structured to
resist change which might threaten their survival.
10
p . 20
.
Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York, 1951)?
In is incipient stages, the innovative education move-
ment promoted the educator as liberator who would eliminate
barriers to learning. This role was then broadened to in-
clude a more active role of educator as facilitator to
help others define and reach their goals. Compensatory
programs, /.'hich fancied themselves as "social change
agencies," went still further and recruited those who
would respond to learning aimed at specific social goals.
It was their conviction that the responsibility to the
larger society transcended individual student needs.
The individual thus becomes a means of an institu-
tional process to create a new social order rather than
an end to be served within the existing society. The
criterion for such a program's success is no longer based
upon the quality of education it provides to the indivi-
dual, but upon whatever universal good is served. As
Clarence Karier points out in speaking of an earlier period
of American educational reform, large numbers of persons
may be educated, but not as critical, individual citizens."^
Is society best served by citizens taught to criticize
society, or by those taught to think critically about
social issues?
Educators acting on the belief that education offers
the solution to most of society's problems are unwilling
to recognize or acknowledge the awesome burdens which far
outweigh the competencies of the educational profession.
Educational institutions are significant mechanisms for
social and intellectual development and for contributing
to socialization processes which are constructive for th~
individual as well as the society. But educational reform
does have its limitations, and those educators who wish to
perform a valuable function for the society can do so per-
haps most effectively by maximizing their impact on the
11Glarence Karier, "Liberalism and the Quest for
Orderly Change," History of Education Quarterly; (Spring, 19 f c.)
.
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intellectual and emotional growth of the young who will, in
time, lead that society.
Who chose education as a vehicle to change society?
Education as an honorific means of social reform and re-
demption has long intrigued those attracted to academia.
Perhaps it is a means of rationalizing one's involvement
in a reform movement which has soured into a boring phe-
nomenon of self-deception and self-justification. Even
in earlier times, long before Horace Mann declared that
"education is the great equalizer of the condition of man,"
teachers have seen their jobs as missions. The stubborn
belief persists that changes in schools will have conse-
quences in the larger society; in fact, our schools are
products of society and thus reflect, as well as shape,
the life of the community.
Paradoxically, American education has no radical
traditions and its historical role has been a conserva-
tive one of social and cultural paternalism. Indeed, con-
sidering the general scarcity of innovative social or poli-
tical ideas in America for nearly 200 years, it is not very
realistic to view educational institutions as forceful
mediums for social or educational reform. Yet, questions
involving appropriate strategies for achieving significant
social change too often become the central issues in de-
vising new learning systems. This is so even as self-
styled reformers have little real sense of just what they
mean by social change.
There are those who argue that public service con-
tributes significantly to social change, because from it
will emanate ideas and knowledge which will be revolutionary
in their impact. (The classic historical example usually
cited is the role of land-grant institutions in agricul-
tural extension for some one hundred years.) More cynical
observers comment that universities have long been agents
of worldwide influence through lucrative research and
^8
recruitment activities in support of the United States' in-
ternational policies and military efforts.
The issue of education as a mechanism for social
change is especially acute since institutions of higher
education, at once complex and archaic, have more than
enough conflicting missions to perform. As we struggle
with the question of whether education is the proper arena
for social action, or simply its intellectual base, higher
education's fundamental roles and purposes, both present
and future, remain as unclear as ever.
The future of post-secondary education presents
some alarming prospects for traditional higher education.
Over the next twenty-five years, for example, there is
likely to be a dramatic increase in alternative educa-
tional institutions (innovative educational inst itut ions
,
other institutions increasingly involved in education, and
quasi-inst itut ional or non-inst itut ional resources for edu-
cation) which implies very significant and fundamental com-
petition for traditional institutions of higher education.
The future role of higher education cannot safely
be extrapolated from past history to construct a simple
linear projection; there are too many unknown variables.
For example, the age eligible population in American col-
leges in 1900 was 4- percent; today that 18-22 year-old age
12group in college has increased tenfold. Higher education'
future purposes cannot be easily speculated upon, when
even its contemporary elements and functions are quite
unclear. Certainly, its traditional role of transmitting
American culture and heritage via a liberal education can-
not be retained if no pervasive and convincing sense of
culture exists. In fact, the notion that a cultured,
12Carl Kayseri, The Higher Learning, the Universities ,
and the Public (Princeton, 1969), p. 11.
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Gd.uc 3.ti 0 n is taught behind ivy walls rather thon
obtained by exposure to the universe is itself subject
to skepticism. As Henry Steele Commagcr has commented,
the United States has a remarkably uncultured society
for one which "teaches" culture so zealously. 1 "
We have absurdly large expectations of higher edu-
cation: it is expected to educate and equalize the society
even as a stratified system of education intensifies; it
is supposed to lead the way in significant research al-
though other institutions are better suited to the task;
it is now faced with the challenge of stimulating social
change through its public service efforts— a notion thrust
upon colleges and universities, although they arc not de-
signed to be problem-solving institutions; it is to train
the populace to be capable of critical thinking while at
the same time preparing highly specialized experts to cope
with the demands of a complex and endangered planet.
Yet, as the pressure mounts on American colleges
and universities to identify a more clearly dileaneated
role in contemporary society, it seems to display even
more glaringly the degradation of higher education. Col-
lege, as seen by many critics, is a training ground for
athletics, a marriage market, a place to temporarily keep
the young out of the lean job market, and an extension
of high school to complete the job which elementary and
secondary schools failed to do in training students to
study and build moral character. To make matters still
worse, the psychology of growth around which the develop-
ment of higher education was based in the 1950s and '60s
has led to disturbing trends of conformity, emphasis on
credentials, isolation of faculty from students, unifor-
mity of structure, and an inability to respond to soc. al
needs
.
^Remarks delivered by H.S. Coinmager at Amherst Col
lege Symposium on "The Future of Higher Education in
a
Changing Society," December 4, 1974.
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Programs whoso themes ax's accessibility, diversity,
and service are at the forefront of emerging national
priorities for post-secondary education in the 1970s.
In its report, "National Policy and Higher Education"
(197 7>), the Newman Commission recommends that higher edu-
c at ion ...be available to and effective for all segments
of the population . . . specifically
,
minorities, women, stu-
dents beyond the traditional college age, and students of
• l 4limited incoem."
The American Association of Higher Education chose
as its focus for 1973 "The Learning Society" and, in its
nationwide workshops, explored issues such as increased
access to higher education, increased diversity of age
and socio-economic status, accreditation of life experi-
ences, and increased programmatic and geographic flexibility.
In its summary of six years of analysis of American
higher education, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Educa-
tion includes in its "Recommendations Deserving Special
Attention: 'Provision by the states of a sufficiency of
ooen-access places within eac 1" state and each metropoli-
tan area; introduction of variable time options for stu-
dent s ... opportunit i.es for broad learning experiences, and
extension and improvement of a series of educational chan-
nels for young oersons to enter adult life and work and
15
service, and not through college attendance alone.'"
As more Americans feel some vague dissatisfaction
with their daily lives, they yearn to find some affirma-
tion of individual worth and recognition through their
work. Through fulfilled vocations, say occupational
sociologists, people derive their deepest sense of belonging
^Reported in The Chronicle of Higher Education ,
October 29, 1973, P* 7
•
^Priorities for Action: Final Report of the Car-
negie Commission on Higher Education (New York, 1973)
,
to their society and their strongest sense of themselves as
productive individuals. This, coupled with the contribu-
tions they can make to their society's economy, is vital
at a time when our basic educational and economic institu-
tions seek viable new roles within a complex and troubled
environment. Accordingly, greater demands will be placed
upon educational systems to serve the more diverse life-
long needs of a more heterogenous population— the working
poor who need skills to break out of low-paying entry jobs;
the technologically displaced whose skills are obsolete;
mothers of school-aged children who need jobs to support
their families
; patients, prisoners, and veterans returning
and readjusting to the mainstream.
But some do not view more universal access to educa-
tion as a very promising trend. Theodore Lowi
,
for one,
argues that to equip the lower classes with lesser mechani-
cal skills is simply to equip them all the better to remain
in their original class position. The effect of offering
practically-oriented courses on a community college basis
to large numbers of working class adults remains to be
16
seen
.
Occupational studies and professional degrees are
still considered inferior to degrees in the traditional
academic disciplines. This is the case even though probably
fewer than twenty percent of current jobs actually require
a four-year college degree. As an irpnic consequence, our
society is experiencing an increase in the numbers of edu-
cated citizens unprepared to meet the special demands of
skilled employment in a highly technocratic society.
Education, within our economic system, has been an-
proached as a business, not as a process of achieving per-
sonal growth, acquiring new knowledge, and developing social
16Theodore Lowi, The Politics of Turmoil (New York,
1971 ), p. 146.
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for human interaction
. It in the crucial, but Lit—
c ogni z sd.
,
distinction between schooling and educa-
tion. .Education in America, in short, has been and con-
tinues to be a condition (and not a very healthy one at
that), not a movement as so many wish it to be.
The Sociology of Organizations
The typical institution of higher education is
characterized by Michael Cohen and James March as an "or-
ganized anarchy" exhibiting the following features: it is
a loose collection of changing ideas, not a coherent struc
ture ; it discovers preferences through action more often
than it acts on the basis of preferences; it does not
understand its own procedures (which are largely based on
trial and error); its organizational boundaries are un-
clear, and its goals vague or in dispute. Over all of
this presides a president who conveys a ritual legitimacy
over the institution's affairs without providing much ex-
17plicit leadership.
Organizations without a solid grasp of what they
are in the present are unable to anticipate and adapt
easily to future conditions. Most perceptible organiza-
tional change does not come about by systematic long-
range planning, but rather through a series of sporadic
reforms brought about by chronic crises. ' While these
reforms might be viewed positively as a state of crea-
tive tension, at some point there are diminishing returns
Daily problems can oromot a perpetual process of revision
and regeneration which becomes routinized rather than re-
vitalizing as intended.
^Michael Cohen and James March, Leadership and
Ambiguity (New York, 1974), p. 34.
18Lon Hefferlin, Academic Reform p. 3-
n 5
The tensions caused by change, divergent values, and
conflict o.l interest groups rather than stability, common
values, and consensus typifies Victor Baldridge's political
model in which he sees the university as a pluralistic
social system fractured by conflicts. 1 * The academic
collegium has long since been replaced by complex social
dynamics wherein policy formulation results from interest
articulation and conflict resolution between competing
interest groups, not the prosaic community of scholars.
Conflict is an inherent and on-going feature of or-
ganizational and group life, and may be symptomatic of an
aoute need for reorganization and for alternative means
of„-djoi-nrg- things. Yet once it is engaged in, it can draw
antagonists into participation and into some resolution
of existing difficulties. Conflict between interest
groups can, and often does, result in significant changes
in institutional policies and procedures, and should not
. . 20be viewed solely as a dehabilitatmg processes.
Warren Bennis has contributed significantly to the
development of a social-psychology of organizational be-
havior, particularly through his concept of "organiza-
tional health." He applies the same criteria to organi-
zations that the mental health profession applies to in-
dividuals in defining the condition of mental health: i.e.,
that they perceive internal and external reality and can
.
. 21
examine these in order to act intelligently.
-^Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University ,
p. 10?.
^Richard Wotruba has examined institutional change
in relation to conflict processes within an institution ol
higher education and its impact upon policy formulation.
See "A Case Analysis of Institutional Change and its Re-
lationship to Conflict With a Focus on Policy Formula-
tion , " (Ed . D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Ij/d)
^Bennis, Changing Organizations , p. pi*
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Too often, however, adaptive, problem-solving
,
or-
ganic structures which are indicators of organizational
health are sabatoged unconsciously by intergroup conflict,
dysfunctional loyalties, cognitive distortions of the out-
si(l£__wg^ld, inability to reach a creative synthesis, and
a win/lose orientation—all indicators of chronic or^ani-
,
— 22
zational sickness.
In their utopian wish to create a happy family at-
mosphere, avoid tough decisions, minimize conflict, and
stress interpersonal relations, organizations exercise
"antagonistic cooperation," i.e., everyone feigns harmony,
2 7'yet everyone acts autonomously. ' There is a tendency,
ever a need, to put up a facade of progress, to operate
under an aura of rational effort, to substitute slogans
for analysis, to repress failures and amplify success.
It is a particularly curious phenomenon that many
organizations which exist to foster change are themselves
able to change only with some difficulty and reluctance.
They are quick to point out where urgent reform is needed
externally ,but unable to identify and evaluate suitable
internal innovations. Most distressing is the inability
to adapt to changes in the environment which necessitate
internal renovation to keep the organization relevant and
functional
.
The reluctance to make a commitment to definable
goals and specific means for accomplishing them ultimately
creates problems at the later stage of implementation.
There are reasons, of course, why most new proposals are
ambiguously grandiose in tone and their purposes vague
in nature. In order to build a broad base of support
and harness sufficient energy to launch such enterprises,
diverse elements must be linked for unified action. Phis
22Ibid., p. 57.
^Riesman and Jencks, Academic Revolutio n, p. 200.
.
.
^5
may be possible only when iniDortant differences are glossed
over, and when specific proposals for organization remain
unstated to lessen potential conflicts and power struggles.
Its advocates are prone to extoll the proposal's virtues
in heroic proportions, inspiring organizational myths
which can linger and disillusion people when they are not
realized. They ask for more than they expect to get and
are angry when they don't get enough. Ideally, a pre-
requisite of sound implementation is goal clarification,
but with all-encompassing goals, everyone interprets them
as_thgy-wish. As a result, the program's original goal
statements and its ultimate operation usually are two
different things.
Most organizations have two structures: one exists
on paper and is generally represented by organizational
charts, policies, and procedures; the other is a complex
set of interrelationships and interfaces which seldom re-
semble the organization's paper profile. In the same way,
many organizations have elaborate models for decision-
making when, in fact, the common approach is to simply
muddle through. Decisions are very often too complex to
be dealt v/ith through the mechanisms of standing or ad hoe
committees, yet this is the usual approach. Issues in com-
mittee are temporarily diffused and relieve management, for
the moment at least, from making difficult decisions, al-
though they are ultimately decided by management anyway,
regardless of how much energy is expended via committees.
Furthermore, ad hoc committees frequently are not apprised
of all information required in order to make realistic de-
cisions. Awareness of political or budgetary constraints
is based on data to which only management is privy in many
instances. With such limitations, a good deal of educa-
tional problem solving is of the reflexive, trial and error
variety
.
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Educators are thinkers by nature, not doers, end
what they do under the guise of reform is often a tem-
porary ploy to pacify educational critics while they con<
sider more reasoned measures. James Shields, Jr., puts
it well by observing that professional educators do not
initiate critical educational policy decisions; they re-
spond to societal forces shaped by the requirements of
our industrial system and mediated by powerful groups.
Thus, the^ do little more than administer their own de-
pendency.
Leadership
Social and educational reformers are plagued with
many weaknesses as they go about assembling the machinery
intended to create new utopias. Particularly viewed with
disdain by them is the phenomenon of power; it is almost
as if there exists an inherent fear of the strength and.
effectiveness which can come from unified thought and ac-
tion. What this develops, suggests Jonath an Kozol
,
is a
cult of incompleteness, a "hang-loose" state of mind, and
a scorn for consistent processes; the final result can
often be communal indecision and paralysis of operations.
Kozol observes that in every free school lasting more than
two years, there is always a power center. ' Where .reli-
ance is placed solely upon conventional wisdom and in the
muthical process of collegial decision making, the pieces
of educational revolution remain unassembled.
In increasingly complex organizations, decision
makers act on the basis of "filtered experience," i.e.,
they have less and less knowledge about the needs of their
^James Shields, Jr., The Crisis in Education is Out
-
side the Classroom (Bloomington, 1975), P- 27.
^Jonathan Kozol, "Free Schools—A Time for Candor,"
Saturday .Review (March 4, 1972).
'I?
clients or even of the organization itself.^ The decision
making unit is often superordinate to the unit within the
organization which must adopt and implement the change;
consequently
,
innovation may have to come about via an
authoritative approach while the subordinate unit seeks
more participation. In either case, decision-making at
s^-ther extreme whether monarchial or mass democracy— —may
be counter-productive. When change does occur in organi-
zational or social systems, the power elite is most likely
to screen out innovations which can potentially restruc-
ture the system, while allowing the introduction of inno-
vations which affected the functioning of the system in
only limited ways. Those without power, meanwhile, are
looking for more substantial change which might offer them
some access to future decisions.
A dilemma is faced by many self-styled educational
"change agents" who aspire to foster change from within
rather than on the fringes of higher education. It pre-
sents a dichotomy between leadership and administration as
described by James Lipham which suggests the paradox and
likely conflict to be encountered by the individual who
is at once responsible for administering on-going pro-
grams and providing innovation for new ones.
We may define leadership as the initiation
of a new structure or procedure for accomplishing...
or changing an organization's goals and objec-
tives. Note that the emphasis here is upon in-
itiating changes .. .the leader is disruptive of
the existing state of affairs.
The administrabor
,
on the other hand ... utilizes
existing structures or procedures to achieve an or-
ganizational goal or objective .. .concerned pri-
marily with maintaining rather than changing
established structures, procedures, or goals...
may be viewed as a stabilizing force. <
^Rogers and Shoemaker, The Communication of Inno -
vat ions
, p. 314.
^W .H . Stickler (ed.), Experimental Colleges; Their
Role in American Higher Education (Tallahassee, 19' ^ ) 1
p. 184.
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To be successful, the innovator must maintain a bal-
ance between deviance and conformity, and be a creative
maverick likely to act individually but also recognizing
when collective action can be useful. Innovators may
bring a diversity of motives to the task and may be char-
acterized as dissident, indifferent, disaffected, or re-
sentful. They may also find tradition suspect simply be-
cause it is traditional and represents a point of refer-
ence from the past; these latter are really pseudo-inno-
vators who will sooner or later become equally dissatis-
fied with innovation they themselves may have introduced.
John Gardner offers a somewhat different profile of
the successful innovator as a creative individual who con-
forms to routine in his everyday life, confining his in-
dependence and creative activity to specific areas which
really concern him. This distinguishes him from the ex-
hibitionist who rejects convention in matters which will
gain him the most attention and noteriety. 22 Too often,
an air of chaos and reckless abandon is instantly inter-
preted as a sign of creativity when the truly creative
performance involves the bringing of order out of chaos.
Economic theorist Joseph Schumpeter, in describing
the role of the economic entrepreneur, offers some in-
sights into entrepreneurial characteristics which could
just as well apply to the implementation of ideas in
non-economic realms. He defines the entrepreneur as that
person capable of putting together the necessary combina-
tion of people and resources which will ultimately trans-
form an idea into action. While the critic points out
what is wrong, the dreamer conjures up grandiose designs
of what might be; the institutional leader frets about
po
Richard Evans and Peter Leppman, Resistance to
Innovation in Higher Education (San Francisco , 1968) , p. 23.
22John Gardner, Self-Renewal: The Individual and
the Innovative Society (New York, 1964) , p4 34
.
'»9
"th.6 consequences of the act l on he would like to take, an i
the planner makes rational and systematic projections. It
is the entrepreneur who breaks the routine, operates out-
side traditional channels, and deals boldly with a hos-
tile, skeptical environment. Success depends uoon in-
tuition and a capacity to foresee and ascertain with
minimal information, the capacity to grasp the essential
and discard the trivial, all this without prescribed prin-
ciples of how it should be done. '
Such an action-oriented approach is often at odds
with the logic of problem solving and the wisdom of plan-
ning and analysis. The entrepreneur is both brazen and
tentative, one who breaks the task into manageable de-
cisions, concentrates on the next step, adapts continu-
ously to changing circumstances, and evolves the future
out of present opportunities.
Usually, however, decisions which affect the future
of higher education continue to be made on the basis of
how institutions can survive rather than what is good edu-
cational policy. Thus, the flamboyant rhetoric of edu-
cational innovation must frequently be compromised to ac-
commodate political and economic practicalities for the
sake of institutional survival.
7)0
Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Develop-
ment (New York, 1961), pp. 7^-9 Z4-»
CHAPTER IV
NON-TRADITIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION: TWO MODRLS
In the late 1960s and through the early '70s,
with the impetus and influx of funds from a variety of
public and private sources, a great many new educational
programs emerged. These took the form of free neighbor-
hood schools, community learning centers, open universi-
ties, regional consortia, and the like. Some of these
enterprises were exceedingly grandiose in aspirations
and equally modest in resources. Others, which did not
differ very much from existing institutionalized efforts,
were able to acquire substantial sums of money.
In reviewing this f ive-to-seven-year period when it
was very much in vogue to launch educational projects of
this nature, it is possible to discern two basic patterns
in the creation and maintenance of such settings. The
first of these was the institutionally-based program, where-
in public schools saw the opportunity to utilize federal
funds to relieve teacher shortages and institutions of
higher education felt the need to respond to the demands
of their students and communities for more practical cur-
ricula and increased public service. Colleges found pub-
lic and private sources quite willing to underwrite the
cost of selected experiments in residential arrangements,
cooperative education, community service internships
,
scholarship programs for inner city and disadvantaged
minorities, student-centered learning, and a myriad of
other ventures which were fashionable without being radi-
cal .
Many educational institutions were quick to ini-
tiate projects by reallocating funds for projects which
would be attached to those institutions and essentially
under their scrutiny and control, lest these fledgling
50
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programs undertake too dramatic a departure from the more
central tasks at hand. Pioneers in such efforts were often
more liberal, untenured faculty and younger administrators,
as well as graduate students who gravitated toward projects
which showed promise of departure from the norms of the
institution.
Funds were often relatively easy to obtain under
the auspeces of the university; the consequence, however,
was in the form of frequent, and sometimes substantial,
concessions to the parent institution. Often, these com-
promises were seen as temporary in the hope that, once
established, programs could gradually exact a greater
margin of freedom by developing a power base which would
foster greater institutional responsiveness to their pro-
gram and its goals.
Meanwhile, counterparts attempting to gain a foot-
hold in non-institutional settings often found themselves
barely tolerated in hostile communities. These community-
based programs were chronically weak and suffered a high
casualty rate; still, they enjoyed a certain measure of
autonomy and freedom, and were able to make accommoda-
tions when necessary to obtain allies. Those which did
survive, though they experienced more acute developmen-
tal pains, gained a relatively permanent, secure status
in their communities, and were able to compete or at
least coexist with more traditional institutions for
recognition, local funding, and clients.
But whatever their origins, educational innovations
today are experiencing increasing difficulty gaining in-
stitutional or public acceptance than in the past. Their
newness wears off quickly, the costs are high, and pro-
posals are often less than innovative. Now, in times of
proposed no-growth budgets in education and a less than
impressive record for many experimental programs, it re-
mains to be seen whether or not the fortunes of campus-
based innovation, in particular, will find themselves in
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an envious position, politically and economically. Com-
petition stiffens for the higher education dollar, pro-
grams quickly fall out of the limelight, constituencies
change priorities, and people become fatigued, many re-
turning to more conventional endeavors where job security
is at least a bit more promising. While community-based
projects are not enjoying substantially better luck than
in the past, they are nonetheless not feeling such a sud-
den erosion of support. It may be that new ideas will
seek to gain acceptance and support by taking their chance
outside the walls of institutions where they once sought
legitimacy and easy money.
If post-secondary institutions are, for whatever
motives, commencing to serve "non-traditional" students
in non-traditional ways, then a rethinking of their
emerging role in adult education seems a prerequisite.
Many adults want education which is immediately useful
to their daily lives and which they view as unavailable
from normal academic fare provided to traditional post-
secondary students. Programs for non-traditional stu-
dents have, to date, been oriented toward part-time at-
tendance at evening classes. These "continuing" educa-
tion programs have met past demands by enabling employed
adults to obtain additional education, but it is becoming
increasingly necessary that higher education remove the
limits of place and time if it is truly to respond to
non-traditional needs.
The need for expanded less-than-baccalaureate op-
portunities, particularly for those citizens inhabiting
non-urban areas, is nowhere more acute than in northern
New England. Here, even the region's half-dozen small
cities have only limited post-secondary resources. Some
states, such as Maine, have no open-access institutions
of post-secondary education, although their economies
could easily absorb more associate degree recipients than
are presently available
.
1
The need for greater access to
this type of education is generally accepted as a major
educational priority in many of these states. The major
iddue remaining is the development of a method and struc-
ture for responding to that need.
Reports and feasibility studies frequently propose
a structure which would unite all existing post-secondary
institutions in a given state, thus forming a public state-
wide system of higher education. The proponents of such
schemes point out that one— and two-year terminal and
transfer programs in vocational/technical and general edu-
cation would become a more integral part of a state sys-
tem by acting in consort with the public colleges and the
state university. Understandably, there are those who
oppose such a consolidation, fearing that affiliation with
larger state institutions and their Boards of Trustees
would jeopardize the unique character of the less-than-
baccalaureate degree and erode the sense of community
found in separate, two-year institutions.
But before an ideal organizational structure to de-
liver less-than-baccalaureate programs can be conceptualized,
developed, and implemented, there are some very practical
issues to consider, not the least of these being cost. It
is clear that most poorer, rural states will not be able
to afford a comprehensive system of community college cam-
puses which might provide the most access to the greatest
majority of citizens. The cost of constructing and staf-
fing campus-based institutions is especially prohibitive
in states with widely dispersed populations, underdeveloped
highway systems, and prolonged, unpredictable winters which
restrict travel.
In thus considering cost and logistical factors, as
well as the particular nature and needs of the target
^"George Connick, Samuel Andrew, and Richard Sturgeon,
"An Alternative Model for Post-Secondary Educational Oppor-
tunity in Southern Maine " (University of Maine, 1973), P-
5 '+
population, it is questionable to hastily conclude that
the most suitable educational model should be of the tra-
ditional variety, i.e., campus-based, with a resident fa-
culty teaching students in ordinary classroom and labora-
tory situations. If, however, one begins with the premise
that post-secondary opportunities must be brought to the
maximum number of people at a minimum cost and that the
primary consideration in determining appropriate organi-
zational structures is access to, and facilitation of,
learning for the student, then different educational con-
cepts must be contemplated.
At this point, a more detailed investigation of two
models for innovative higher education will be developed.
The first of these—institutionally-based programs—will
be examined through an overview of the organizational
development of the University Without Walls at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts at Amherst. An in-depth case
study of the Community College of Vermont will then fol-
low. While limited in scope, and overview of the insti-
tutional program has been included here because it of-
fers useful comparisons and contrasts with the community-
based model. The study is not intended to weigh the
relative merits of one's educational program against the
other; but rather to elucidate the social, political, and
organizational distinctions which emerge in tracing the
development of each.
An Overview of the Institutional Model :
The University Without Walls2
The University Without Walls exists at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts as one of over twenty univer-
sity-sponsored projects (which carry the label of "special
programs ) under an Associate Provost for Special Programs.
This arrangement is, of course, convenient and comfortable
for the University; it gives the appearance of substan-
tial University commitment to new ventures and suggests
that an effective vehicle exists for the coordination and
development of such efforts. In fact, these special pro-
grams are set apart from the larger University, and have
the sense of not only being special but temporary in na-
ture. Each competes with the other, particularly at bud-
get submission time when resources for such programs are
seen not only as special, but superfluous as well.
Non-traditional programs, particularly at public in-
stitutions within states whose governors or legislatures
are taking an increasing hard line toward higher educa-
tion (Massachusetts is but one of several examples), must
deal with an administration which publicly articulates a
commitment to such programs in general, but goes on to
require budget cuts. At the same time, faculty concern
over job security puts pressure on deans to lobby for
departments at the expense of "special programs." As
pressure mounts, it is the administration, established
schools, and stronger departments which have lobbies
able to resist attack. The usual argument against more
funds for non-traditional projects is that their promi-
nence within the institution will inevitably lead to a
lowering of standards. The non—traditionalist s agree
that standards are an issue, but for them it is a matter
^The observations, analyses, and conclusions pre
sented in this section are based upon my affiliation with
UWW as a part-time staff assistant from 9/73 to 6/75« During
this period, I had access to program documents, participated
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of changing standards, not lowering them. The decision-
makers are reluctant to abandon experimental programs al-
together, but neither are they comfortable defending them
very forcefully.
As with most other special programs, the University
Without Walls (UWW) at Amherst began with the stimulus of
a small group who were able to match their early ideas of
what they felt they wanted with some initial funding suf-
ficient to initiate a trial effort with the tacit support
of the University. The timing was propitious at Amherst;
with the stimulus of an energetic new Dean, the School of
Education was rapidly developing a much more prominent
profile on and off campus, and was successfully securing
funding and support for a variety of new projects from
both internal and external sources.
Rachel Tompkins, in attempting to identify the cri-
tical elements of the organizational processes involved
in emplementing new programs at large universities, has
developed an insightful chronology of the beginnings of
the University Without Walls. She characterizes it
neither as fad or revolution, but rather as an attempt to
move an institution in new educational directions. She
quickly points out its major paradoz ; i.e., it was an al-
ternative model to be created within the very institu-
tion (with all the standard operating procedures of academic
x
life) which it was intended to supplant.
The original goals of UWW were to: (1) provide ac-
cess to those individuals not presently served; (2) pro-
mote personal and institutional change. It was hoped
that each of these objectives could be realized through
in staff and committee meetings, and spoke individually
with many staff members about the program's development.
^Rachel Tompkins, "Patterns of Program Implemen-
tation" (Ed.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1975),
p. 22.
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a personal commitment on the part of each staff member to
shared ideals, even if there was not complete agreement
on either the definition or methods for implementation
of these goals.
The planners believed that UWW's presence at the
University of Massachusetts would provide a model for the
University which would generate alternative learning modes
emphasizing student initiative and responsibility, en-
couraging self-expression and individual goal setting,
as well as social commitment. By promoting these educa-
tional goals, UWW staff hoped to affect others working
within the institution and ultimately influence the de-
cision-makers in directions which would make the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts more accessible, particularly to
older and poorer students.
The original proposal, as Tompkins describes it,
was heroic in tone, but vague in content; "a loose col-
lection of good ideas... that should have made just about
everyone (within the University administration) nervous."^
She identifies many of the people involved in UWW's early
stages (a total of some 70 faculty and students, primarily
from the School of Education) as dreamers given to broad
philosophical statements about the purposes of higher edu-
cation.
The planning process was arduous and prolonged and
characterized by confusion, lack of closure, continuing
unresolved conflict, and energy consumed dealing with the
dynamics of the planning group itself. Nothing was ever
completely rejected, yet nothing was ever quite agreed
upon. As a result, few specifics were developed as to
5
how the program would actually work.
Then came the political phase of testing the pro-
posed program on the institution and individuals within
^Ibid
. ,
p. 23. ^Ibid . , p. 44.
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it crucial to UWW's acceptance or rejection. Fortunately
for UWW's conceivers, several highly-placed University
administrators, including the President, were interested
in new programs geared to provide increased access for
new types of adult learners. Faculty response and sup-
port was solicited to test what was acceptable and what
was objectionable. The new, young, and limited staff
of UWW wanted the first students to be capable and in-
dependent people who would not cause problems and threaten
the program's cautious support from faculty. The initial
thirty students who were accepted were older, experienced,
and more self-directed than the usual undergraduate fresh-
man.
In the spring of 1972, UWW was approved by the Fa-
culty Senate for a three-year period. Despite its vague-
ness, the proposal did attempt to spell out the program's
guidelines and structure in a manner acceptable to the
University. One of the compromises effected was that
UWW's students would have to meet the University's core
requirements. Tompkins observes that as the process
moved further from the original ideas and closer to poli-
tical maneuvering for approval, some of those involved in
the planning drifted away, feeling bitter that UWW would
not be their utopian community.
By the fall of 1975, the program had grown rapidly;
it now had a total of over 200 active students from Pitts-
field to Cape Cod, including almost fifty in the Boston
area alone. The Associate Provost for Special Programs
had been relatively generous, and the UWW budget increased
each year. Several new additions to the staff were made
to deal with the increased enrollment. An additional
core faculty member was hired, and the number of teaching
assistants doubled to supplement the small staff attempting
to share tasks of admissions, advising, record-keeping, and
the myriad of other chores necessary to keep an ever-ex-
panding program functioning. Meanwhile, although personnel
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resources had been increased at the Amherst central office,
part-time adjunct faculty based in the various cluster
sites remained approximately the same size.
Mid-way through the 1973-74 academic year, a subtle
tension began to be felt. There was a growing feeling
that communication with, and support to, the state-wide
clusters was increasingly inadequate; and there seemed
to be more work to do in the office and more students to
counsel than staff available. All-day staff workshops
and weekly staff meetings still did not appear to remove
or resolve the confusion of purpose and method. Staff
generally attributed these internal difficulties to a
lack of adequate support from the University.
A successful effort was made to seek increased
funding, and by fall 1974, the third and final year of its
three-year mandate from the Faculty Senate, UWW had a stu-
dent enrollment of over 250
,
a staff and faculty of about
20, and a University funding level of nearly $200,000
annually. UWW appeared to be successfully expanding its
innovative role within the University. Staff enthusiasm
and energy appeared high and the year off to an encouraging
beginning.
Yet, before the fall semester was completed, a vague
dissatisfaction—a sort of organizational ennui—had set
in; staff meetings hinted of chronic frustration, behind
a facade of polite but persistent complaints. Some at-
tempt was made, in response, to institute a more hierarchal,
differentiated staffing pattern with a division of labor
and delegation of responsibilities. This has been a dif-
ficult transition to effect because many staff who are
unaccustomed to organizational settings are strongly com-
mitted to a highly participatory decision-making process.
While some staff called for a more collective ap-
proach to policy formulation, others urged the Director
to provide more assertive leadership, making necessary
6°
decisions when larger groups were unable to reconcile their
differences on policy issues. At the same time, the Policy
Board, having more confidence in the program, preferred to
maintain a low profile, serving primarily in an advisory
capacity, rather than in a policy-making role. As a con-
sequence, the program seemed not entirely in control of
its own growth, unsure of its future directions, and con-
fused about how to effectively deal with the problems of
the present. Nobody was willing to exercise authority too
forcefully at the risk of appearing to be moving toward a
hierarchal bureaucracy that was too task-oriented and not
sufficiently sensitive to personal needs and relationships.
In its earlier days, UWW's organizational life was
relatively simple; developing a style for the program was
a matter of individual taste, and decision-making was
accomplished informally amongst the small staff. Now, as
the organization is growing larger and becoming more com-
plex, and additional staff with new attitudes are hired,
clarification of goals and individual roles is needed.
Staff need a clearer definition of standards and procedures
in order to make basic decisions; they want to help formu-
late major policy, but they also want increased direction
and structure where little currently exists. They want,
in short, a program which is humane, flexible, exciting,
and rewarding on the one hand; but one which also has a
definiteness and clarity of purposes and procedures for
achieving the program's objectives and gives its parti-
cipants a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction.
Seymour Sarason points out that consensual agree-
ment on vague new values is inadequate in developing
viable new settings; values and feelings are necessary,
but not sufficient, for creating settings. Settings are
created as if they will automatically work as planned
with no specific provisions for implementation, and no
mechanism for accommodating change; thus, participants may have
difficulty in anticipating problems and consequences. The
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result is often optimism being replaced by pessimism and
consensus overcome by polarization. Clark and Appley also
suggest the same weakness;
... Since the establishment of the alternative is
the primary objective, the real expectations are
still implicit... There cannot be an alternative
if it cannot be defined. Intentionality must be
faced and a social contract made explicit... Some
groups cannot deal with facing up to their inten-
tions and the group dies rather than set limits on
its indecisiveness .7
Attempting to plan the future when there is not a
comprehensive method to understand the present results in
nebulous, non-directed movement wherein everyone has a
notion of what should not happen but nobody is at all cer-
tain what is happening at the moment or what should happen
in the future. UWW, like so many other alternative ef-
forts, is made up of individuals joining together to build
a common effort, but their impulse toward individual free-
dom often conflicts with the constraints imposed by com-
munal or organizational ventures.
Those who argue most forcefully for a collective
approach to every facet of an organization's operations
are themselves contributing to the perpetuation of a myth
that all participants, through shared commitment, also
share equal responsibility for the processes and outcomes
of the organization. In fact, there is no one responsible
in this arrangement, because it is not a collective entity,
but rather a collection of individual altitudes and phi lo—
sophies which permeate virtually every decision of policy
and procedure which confronts the organization . Respon-
sibility, when delegated to the group as a whole, rests
with no one in particular.
^Sarason, The Creation of a Community Setting , p. 7
7
>.
^Thomas Clark and Dee Appley, "The Rise and Fall of
Practically Every Alternative," (unpublished, .University
of Massachusetts, 1971)-
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At the crux of the University Without Walls' organiza-
tional difficulties is the question of leadership and de-
cision-making. It has never been clear where the focus
of leadership exists. The role and position of the Direc-
tor is confusing to the staff, and it is equally unclear
who is responsible for some decisions. As in the early,
informal days of the program, values and procedures are
implicitly understood through "common law." Thus, stan-
dard operating procedures evolve haphazardly, rather than
by direct and deliberate implementation. Decisions are
very often made through a vague, informal process in which
new proposals surface for exposure in some oblique fashion,
and then somehow gradually insinuate themselves into opera-
tion.
Reluctance to initiate changes or policies which
might bring temporary resistance, results in constant frus-
tration with prevailing conditions. Acceptable procedures
for implementing new ideas, or for resolving old problems,
do not exist. Frequently, the more difficult issues that
surface at staff meetings are handled by an expression of
intent by all to "sit down and work that out." The absence
of any effective means for problem solving and feedback is
thus perpetuated. Consensual solutions to minor internal
operational problems are not taken seriously by staff be-
cause they are accustomed to "playing it by ear" and dead-
lines and procedures are seldom enforced in any consistent
way
.
New organizations often tend to simplify a myriad
of problems as a defensive tactic to protect themselveo
from the fear of possible failure. There is an expectation
of a time when fewer problems will exist and turmoil will
be reduced. This myth can dull the group's survival in-
stincts to a point where organized self-deception clouds
both internal and external realities.
8Sarason, The Creation of Settings , p. 7
7
>-
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An organization establj shed, to accomplish complex
tasks must compete for survival amidst political and eco-
nomic realities which demand strategic and sophisticated
responses if that organization is to maintain its integrity,
its quality, and its budget. It is not a commune which can
operate indefinitely on the good feelings of its collective
self. Organizations must function in the real world; not
within utopian environments which might someday be possible.
A highly differentiated system generally has a rela-
tively low conflict level because its elements are some-
what independent and insulated from one another. On the
other hand, conflict may be aggravated when there is in-
sufficient structure to aid in conflict resolution and an
absence of procedures to deal with contested issues. In-
stead of clear lines of communication and a stable policy-
making mechanism, there is what Victor Baldridge calls
9
"situational improvisation."
Nevit Sanford has suggested that as higher educa-
tion becomes more complex, individuals who live and func-
tion within it must, in order to maintain their humanity
and sanity, be able to predict, or at least explain what
happens. "Members of organizations who do not understand
... n 10
their machinery are destined to become cogs within it."
This is especially true for those whose personal happiness
is tied almost exclusively to the success of their reform
movement s
.
The net result of chronically dysfunctional activity
is a sort of organizational paralysis which sets in and
pervades the entire tone of the enterprise. In their ef-
fort to be all things to all people, especially their
potential friends and allies, innovative programs find it
especially difficult to define themselves with any absolute
^Baldridge, Power and Conflict , p. 116.
10Sanford, The American College , p. 9-.
precision. Without clear-cut aims, rules, and procedures
with sanctions and authority, innovators devote too much
time to discussion and not enough energy to implementation.
As a result, they often suffer from ambiguity, confusion
11 '
’
and emotional fatigue. Wo program can afford to wait un-
til there is complete agreement about the universal ends
of education; it must begin with some generally desirable
and reasonably specific objective and take action. Even
tentative action can generate fresh thinking or improve
upon ideas which have reached an impasse.
While there is an intellectual commitment to chanme,
the prevailing norm is to procrastinate until external
pressures ultimately force an organization into reactive
measures which are often more constraining than if it had
initiated actions which previously had generally been recog-
nized as desirable. Unless organizations are willing to
take conscious responsibility for their own solutions,
they may perceive themselves as by-products of processes
and events conceived and initiated by others over which
they have no control. Without data for decision-making,
without methodological tools, without explicit direction,
not only is an organizat ion 1 s full potential not achieved,
but it can gradually evolve into a downward spiraling sys-
tem which will require outside diagnosis and intervent ion
.
A key task of leadership, but one which is seldom
put into practice although frequently articulated, is
building a collaborative climate which accommodates a high
degree of both autonomy and participation. The best way
to insure an absence of a synergetic element within an
organization is to employ talented people and allow them
to do a job in isolation. The result is a self-contained,
non-communicative system with a minimum of trust, empathy,
and interaction—all elements essential to increase pro-
ductivity through collaboration. Educational institutions,
like other organizations, are systemic by nature; to
alter
11 Ibid
. ,
p . 802 .
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their operations significantly requires efforts on several
fronts by several means. 12 This cannot occur in any mean-
ingful way without a synergistic process which develops
through collaboration. Innovation is not likely to occur
in isolation, but rather when there exists a network of
elements or individuals with a stake in progress.
The investment of time and energy which UWW has
made in planning for the future might be interpreted as
a remarkably far-sighted enterprise. Yet, many of the
staff have become exceedingly frustrated because they per-
ceive the activity as a convenient escape mechanism to
avoid dealing with current diff icultues . They contend
that the program is constantly redesigning itself, but
does not take the time and effort to ever improve upon
15
what exists. A program must live simultaneously on
two levels—one being the pragmatic day-to-day enterprise
of survival, and the other being some vision of what the
enterprise might be like in the future. But this vision
of future potential must be linked with the present by
using it as a guide to evaluate and improve existing day-
to-day procedures .
^
Because there is an inverse correlation between the
level of philosophizing and the degree of operationalizing,
this future orientation persists in lieu of concern for the pre
sent. And while a program may acknowledge that its opera-
tion may be something less than perfect, it rationalizes
its deficiencies by asserting that it more than compen-
sates by its personal concern for its clients where other
organizations may be more efficient, but at the expense
of any humane orientation. The irony of this attitude is
that these programs do not operate with the same competence
which they hope to develop in, and expect from, their students
12Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform , p. 14-0.
^Discussions with UWW staff during spring, 1975 -
1Zl
Riesman and Jencks, Academic Revolution , p. 465.
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If new programs concentrated more upon their organi-
zational processes and less upon their future greatness, the
general malaise that permeates so many new programs could
be substantially reduced, and their productivity increased.
It seems that programs of the UWW variety—which oppose
and abandon the traditions of prescribed courses, grades,
residence requirements, etc.—also feel compelled to reject
operating procedures which could make them more effective
in their goal of reforming existing institut ions
.
Self-styled "change agents" need to be reminded fre-
quently that appropriate mechanisms along with activist at-
titudes are needed to complete the change equation. Un-
fortunately, values favoring change are meaningless unless
they express possibilities which can actually be realized.
Alternative programs frequently reject much of what is and
what has come before, but are not always able to offer the
alternative in practice. The bonds of an organization must
not only be normative in terms of shared beliefs, attitudes,
and values, but also be structural with established patterns
of interaction. 1 ^ Unity of mission requires unity of ac-
tion, which is possible only through a well-defined pro-
cess of decision-making and a well-developed system to
manage those decisions once they are made.
Parsons and Platt point out that an integrated sys-
tem of common values is an essential, structural component
of a stable social system and, accordingly, any suggested
change in mission also implies important structural con-
sequences. lo However, if an educational organization is
unwilling to accept the fact that any image of the future
necessarily challenges its current structural arrangements,
1
^James Perkins, The University as an Organization ,
(New York, 1973) , P* 166.
l^Talcott Parsons and Gerald Platt , The American
University (Cambridge, 1973), P- 346.
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then no organic connection exists between education and
change, and consequently, education cannot serve as a
medium through which change is possible.
The internal reforms necessary to achieve external
goals are possible only if there is an institutionalization
of means, i.e., the process for achieving goals becomes
17itself the goal. This distinction is crucial; organiza-
tions become frustrated because they do not recognize that
their troubles stem not so much from an inability to ar-
rive at goals, but rather from lack of attention to the
specific actions necessary to operationalize goals al-
ready agreed upon. It is curious that educational experi-
ments which value the pedagogical process over specific
content material for its students, give such scant atten-
tion to their own basic organizational processes. Quality
is professed, but mediocrity prevails.
Some Implications of an Institutional Model
As with many non-tradit ional educational ef fort s , despite
ample documents, UWW still has no philosophy, no uni-
fying principle around which reforms can be conceptualized
and activated. It must face choices, changes, and challenges
without a solid conceptual base; in its stead, as Wairen Ben—
nis puts it in describing the character institutional re-
form often assumes, is a pastiche of ideas and influences
too abstract and motley to jell into a coherent whole. Ef-
forts which begin as alternatives to existing institutions
cannot become convincing alternatives if they cannot be
defined. However often they may be repeated with increasing
zeal, oversimplified cliches simply do not serve as a very
sound basis for serious educational reform.
^Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics of Academic Reform , p. 12.
18Harold Taylor, How to Change College^ (New York,
1971), P- 178.
68
The University Without Walls' title itself provokes
many of the questions which the staff must struggle with
daily: Is it really a university? Does it, in fact, exist
without walls? What exactly is its model for operating?
What is its relationship to the parent institution which
does, of course, have walls? Some answers are possible.
UWW is not a separate entity from, or an alternative to,
the University of Massachusetts. It acts, in effect, as
a facilitator or ombudsman for its students to negotiate
the requirements of the University and, as such, it is
very much a part of the institution which it is never quite
able to circumvent. Its students are, after all, students
of the University who are fortunate enough to have an al-
ternative means to complete, and sometimes expedite, their
baccalaureate program. But it does not then offer an al-
ternative to grades, core requirements, etc.; it simply
makes available to them more palatable options for ful-
filling University requirements (e.g., independent study,
practicum, credit for prior learning).
UWW has not been able to define for itself a solid
operational or conceptual model upon which to proceed.
It would like to articulate and operationalize a dis-
tinct mission which could encompass its stated goals, but
as yet it has been unable to do so. It is eclectic at
best and chaotic at worst. Unable to go entirely its own
way and escape its dependency upon the University, UWW
has not really been forced to prove or define itself on
its own. As a consequence, UWW has not developed a separ-
ate or distinct identity or mission of its own. If it had
been established with less structural ties to a large pub-
lic institution (e.g., as a decentralized, open, community-
based learning services model throughout the Commonwealth),
its impact and its clientele might today be considerably
different and distinctive.
^9
The fact that seventy-five percent of UWW's staff and
faculty is concentrated in Amherst where only twenty-five
percent of its students are located accentuates the in-
herent flaw of the educational innovation whose freedom
and flexibility to innovate is seriously hampered by its
nearly complete dependence upon the parent institution:
the geographic limitations it imposes, the reliance upon
faculty support, the competition for recognition and re-
sources, the orientation of staff and faculty to institu-
tional demands, and the students' programs shaped by in-
stitutional standards.
UWW's three-year existence has not changed the Uni-
versity system in any noticeable way because it is that
very system which tolerates it, motivated by self-interest
rather than a genuine commitment to educational alterna-
tives. Michael Miles, in writing of the development of
UWW nationally, argues that the project simply extends
and exaggerates trends underway among ma
t
jor universities
which have nothing to do with change in higher education.
Whatever freedom UWW has, he argues, is only freedom to
19
cheat the system, not to change it.
Though many special programs operate within the in-
stitution and even assume some of its forms and functions,
they likely remain temporary systems which will not be com-
pletely accepted as a permanent part of the organization.
If they, as innovations, are to spread from a temporary
to a permanent status, more effective linkages between
those systems must be devised.
The evolution of the University Without Walls pro-
gram over the first three years of its existence, as with
most other innovative efforts, can be characterized as a
network of informal alliances, a loose organizational
structure, serendipitous rather than deliberate in approach.
At a time when innovation was contagious, the program moved
^
^Michael Miles, "Second Thoughts About the External
Degree," Change (September, 197^), P*
r>
•
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along on its own momentum, generating its own energy and
excitement. But as an adjunct of a more static institu-
tion, the University Without Walls' ability to operate
largely on the basis of its own stimulus as an innovative
program has diminished. Where it could once appear suc-
cessful merely by "letting things happen" without a deli-
berate and specific strategy or technique, today it finds
itself increasingly dependent on the University because
it continues to operate without any history of "making
things happen." It is more hesitant to initiate anything
new, preferring to w'ait and see" what the University's
position will be vis-a-vis special programs now that re-
sources are scarce.
Without the rapid influx of new ideas and opportu-
nities for perpetual innovation and development, which
formerly provided distraction and relief from the frus-
trations of daily maintenance problems, the staff must now
work harder to introduce change into the existing operation
with a minimum of disruption. Often, the novelty wears off
quickly and worthwhile proposals die for want of someone
to pursue them. Of necessity, more time must now be spent
in stabilizing earlier innovations at the expense of ac-
commodating new ones.
It is particularly the less experienced, more idealis
tic, and often younger persons newly involved in higher edu
cation who are likely to lose hope, as well as their ef-
fectiveness, because they are unwilling to acknowledge, or
engage in, the political effort required to accomplish
desired goals. They too often convince themselves that
because their cause is noble, it will be well received and
immune to opposition. After a few successive failures,
they may become as easily convinced that few real changes
ever derive from creative imagination from within the edu-
cational system. It is this widespread disenchantment , in
fact, which has led to the proliferation of extra-insti-
tutional efforts at educational reform.
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l atricia Grosson
,
in studying change factors signi-
ficant in the planning and development of UWW at the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Amherst, discovered that what
re sponden t s perceived to be the single most important fac—
tor in the success ol the UWW effort was internal rather
than external, i.e., a group of energetic and committed
20people. Additionally, as pointed out by Alan Wolfe in
speaking of UWW nationally, failures of experimental ef-
forts result not because of pressures from outside the ex-
periment but from confusion and tension generated within
.. 21it
.
Curiously enough, despite the program's close af-
filiation with the University, it must seek its way with
little guidance, feedback, or reinforcement from any source,
internal or external. While UWW ' s movement is constrained
by its association with a bureaucracy, it seems paradoxi-
cally to suffer from too much distance from any external
reality which can respond to, and reinforce, its existence.
It is this vagueness of autonomy and authority to experi-
ment and to substantiate what learning is which is the
critical hindrance in establishing UWW's viability as an
alternative educational program. As a "special program"
of a state university, it is always part of a university
with walls and, as such, must constantly scale those in-
stitutional barriers in order to achieve any gains for its
students and itself.
Newer institutions within conventional institutions
cannot ultimately escape the premises of the system they
are attempting to improve, as long as they are simultaneously
dependent upon that system. Such newer efforts at academic
reform are particularly conspicuous within larp;e state uni-
versity complexes which are trying to become something other
^Grosson, "Toward a Theory of Change: Three Case
Studies in One University," (Ed.D. dissertation, University
of Massachusetts, July 197^) •> P* 295.
^Alan Wolfe, "The Experimental College—Notable Con-
tradiction," Change , (March-April 1970), p. 27.
. ,
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than what they already are. When these alternative sub-
systems do succeed, or at least survive, in some measure it
is perhaps in spite of, rather than because of, the parent
institution. In fact, innovations which are adopted readily
by the predominant system must quickly ask themselves if
their acceptance is perhaps predicated on the belief that
they are relatively innocuous, unlikely to disturb the
g-^ bus and considered reasonably ineffective at intro-
ducing any substantive change.
While Patricia Crosson concluded that special program
units do serve as vehicles for change throughout the in-
stitution, it would probably be more accurate to conclude
that what actually occurs is procedural change rather than
substantive change. She suggests this in noting:
Ihe data lrom the case studies revealed that once
a planning and developmental process was set in
motion, the original objectives for those pro-
grams began to be overridden by other, more or-
ganizational considerations. Individuals seemed
to be more concerned with issues of power, status,
and control, and the programs seemed to be more
interested in growth for its own sake, rather
than for the realization of any objective. In a
sense, programs began to assume the same character-
istics as the organization as a whole. 22
Perhaps it is too much to expect that fundamental
change will occur within older structures perpetuated by
tradition and forced to cope simultaneously with a vari-
ety of forces that either buttress their past or press
for modifications to accommodate the future. Adjustments
to these forces make institutional decision-makers sensi-
tive to the need for change, yet cause them to fear the
consequences of any changes they might initiate.
Harold Taylor in a recent work, How to Change Colleges ,
pessimistically observes that educational administrators
^Crosson, "Three Case Studies," pp. 282-288.
7 7^
cannot change the system they have inherited, and they know
very little anyway about how changes can best be brought
about. He feels that if creative thought and action are
going to result in educational change, they must be in-
tegrally linked to the forces which influence policy making
in the university as a whole, perhaps transforming the in-
stitution into a different organism more conducive to fur-
ther change.
^
In assessing the contribut ions of the experimental
colleges to date, Alan Wolfe sees little to applaud. Host
innovative programs are run primarily for or by the elite
who can afford to experiment as long as they preserve, in
some way, what they already have. Novel educational pro-
cedures, maintains Wolfe, are a far cry from notable social
changes. The real commitment to, and potential for, signi-
ficant social change is found instead in community colleges
and other places where large numbers of people do go, or
would like to go, to school and for whom education is still
2A
a social phenomenon.
Herbert London, in speaking of UWW as a national ex-
periment, sees that it cannot have it both ways in its at-
tempt to be a half-way house between academe and a school-
less society. Either UWW must merge more effectively with
the communities it serves, or it must become integrated
with the institution from which it operates. As they ex-
ist today, according to London, experimental programs such
as UWW must have modest objectives, realizing that they
cannot do much to change the basic character of higher
education or society by being an alternative track for a
small group. His cryptic conclusion is that we should not
take the revolutionary rhetoric and its exaggerated claims
25
in the name of experimentation very seriously.
^Taylor, How to Change Colleges , p. 56ff.
?\olfe, "The Experimental College—Notable Contra-
diction," pp. 26-^2.
^Herbert London, "University Without Walls: Reform
or Rip-Off?," Saturday Review (September 16, 1972).
A Case Study of the Community—Based Model :
The Community College of Vermont
In its June 1973 editorial, Change magazine outlined
a rather dismal picture of the process and product of non-
traditional higher education. Singled out for particular
merit, however, was the Community College of Vermont (CCV)
which Change characterized as a "youthful band of para-
educators who have created a highly imaginative and prac-
tical instrument for educational service and social change."
Beginning without a clear sense of what to accomplish, where
to go, and how to do it, they exercised their options, took
some chances, and made key moves before many people had
grasped their ultimate significance. Change sums up its
description of the Community College as a successful, if
imperfect, performance which followed no rulebooks because
it had no reputation to lose; "out of mistakes and luck
have come achievements to be around after other more pub-
26
licized and politicized programs are forgotten."
This rather idealized synopsis of CCV 1 s development
serves as a useful introduction to the issues with which
this study is concerned. The practical challenges of
daily survival and organizational crises which come with
the creation and implementation of innovation require
that rhetorical objectives be transformed into an opera-
tional program. It is the social and organizational di-
mensions of this transformation from ideas to action, from
rhetoric to reality, which are now examined.
26
"The Politics of Change," Change (June 1975), P- 16
2?For an excellent descriptive summary of CCV '
s
his-
tory through 1974, see David Kinsey, "Open Learning Systems
Case of the Community College of Vermont (USA), (1974).
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Since its beginnings in late 1970 with a half-million
dollar, 30-month demonstration grant from the Office of
Economic Opportunity, the Community College of Vermont has
generated a considerable amount of attention in its at-
tempt to provide alternative sources and types of post-
secondary learning experiences to a largely rural, widely
dispersed, low-income population of Vermont. This section
reviews CCV's pre-history and origins; the social and poli-
tical context in which it was nurtured; its values, assump-
tions; its models for development; and its approaches in
transforming its goals into practical programs for the
people of Vermont.
following this discussion of CCV's ideological and
political origins, and a description of the social and edu-
cational context in which it began, a number of questions
have been addressed: What was its perception of the edu-
cational needs of a provincial, geographically dispersed,
low-income population? What were CCV's approaches in com-
municating its services to prospective students and com-
munities? Have its techniques been unique, or has it merely
been a cheaper version of rather conventional post-secondary
education? In its struggle for survival, what have been
the "hidden costs" of obtaining support and security? Is
it now part of the very system to which it had once as-
pired to be an alternative? Has it reached a point of
diminishing returns in its capacity to stimulate and pio-
neer new learning systems? Its development will be traced,
its rhetoric will be examined, its compromises analyzed.
Its current status, and its social and educational impact
(as seen by itself and others) will be assessed, and a
prognosis for its future will finally be ventured.
Among other issues to be considered: What styles
of leadership and decision-making characterized the pro-
gram? Who were its advocates and adversaries? How much
did external forces actually determine the program's direc-
tions? What pre-conditions existed to shape its subsequent
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development? Were its tactics offensive or defensive?
Who were the people attracted to participate and what mo-
tivated them? How were individual intentions transformed
into organizational practice? Has CCV met its goals or
promised too much and delivered too little? And, in short,
is there a discrepency between its rhetoric and reality?
The Social Setting
41 • 2# of Vermont adults 25 years of age and over
do not have high school education (1970 census).
In 1972, 58.4
-% of Vermont's high school graduates
continued their education in colleges, or univer-
sities, whereas the average for the nation is
about 54-%. 28
What was the social context in which CCV chose to
meet the challenge for reform and relevance in higher edu-
cation? A 1975 Office of Economic Opportunity report con-
firms that the undereducated in Vermont are also the poor
who, besides having a generally lower level of educational
attainment, also have limited employment opportunities,
live primarily in rural (and often isolated) areas, and
represent a high proportion of those of foreign extrac-
tion for whom English is a second language. Today, "under-
educated" has generally come to mean lacking a high school
diploma or its equivalent. But, large numbers of adults
in Vermont are functioning at a level far below that ex-
pected of a high school graduate, and many cannot read or
write at all. While grade levels are not very meaningful
as a determiner of literacy, the 1970 census shows that
in the age group over 25 years old, nearly 45% ol the pop-
ulation (almost 100,000) have not finished high school,
and 20,000 over 25 years old have not finished the eighth
. 29grade
.
^Steven Hochschild and James Johnston, Post—Secondary
Education Access Study, Part I," (1975), P* 5*
^Adult Education Report, (Montpelier, Vermont, 1974).
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There are, of course, no discernible poverty ghettos
in Vermont; large numbers of the poor and undereducated
exist in all parts of the state, but 70# of them live in
rural farm areas where severe poverty is most pronounced.
Because poverty and affluence are juxtaposed over a widely
dispersed area, the poor maintain a low profile— isolated,
independent, proud, asking for little and getting even less.
The daily misery which a poor family comes to accept is
shared with no one else; in this sense, the rural poor are
not active members of any community or group.
The state's social service agencies are largely con-
centrated in Vermont's few "urban" areas, i.e., towns of
10,000 or more; and little effort has been made in the
past to develop effective outreach programs to seek out
the isolated poor and determine their needs. Nearly every
social agency approaches the poor from a particular frame
of reference: the employment office tends to see them pri-
marily as people needing work; the public health nurse sees
them as a family needing better dental care; the adult edu-
cation center would like them to become more literate. But
functional literacy or a filled cavity is not likely to be
a first priority for most poor, undereducated adults; their
needs are more immediate and more interwoven, and can best
be achieved by bringing to bear at one time the services
of a wide variety of programs and agencies through a co-
ordinated service delivery system.
The Community College Concept
The concept of a community college for Vermont grew
out of a committee appointed by Governor Philip Hoff in
1968, whose task was to consider the question of the de-
sirability and feasibility of additional vocational-tech-
nical colleges in Vermont. The commission, chaired by then
Commissioner of Education Harvey Scribner, included mostly
representatives from business and industry. It was Scribner
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who was responsible for forcefully articulating the con-
cept of bringing education to Vermont communities sharing
local talents and skills with others on a self-supporting
basis. Scribner himself admits that the proposal was
concocted almost out of thin air at a time when other
programs such as Empire State College and the University
Without Walls were still unknown entities. Yet, despite
the suddenness and the newness of the idea, it was some-
how recognized as very suitable to Vermont's needs. It
had instant appeal for practical-minded businessmen in
Montpelier, legislators from regions of the state where
no state college existed, and Governor Deane Davis, al-
though it may not have been politically tenable for him
to promote it at that point.
The Commission considered several alternatives:
(1) To build more vocational-technical facilities; (2) To
expand present facilities; (3) To establish extension cen-
ters with existing institutions; and (4) To establish a
community college. Their choice was the community col-
lege option, if it could be done in such a way as to dis-
card the stereotyped notion of community college as an
extension of high school or a second-best type of college.
They proposed a new concept which would be a non-campus
system able to go wherever there was a need or interest
matched with an appropriate resource. (This concept is
similar to the network of "learning webs" proposed by
Ivan Illich.) Scribner recognized that this approach to
community education, while responsive and flexible, would
also require credibility in order that learning could be
documented and credits transferred to other institutions.
The Commission insisted on open-access to this new
college, accepting those without high school diplomas,
facilitating participation from working class people by
^Scribner publicly proposed the Community College
of Vermont concept in an address to the Vermont New Careers
Conference in 1970.
^Interview with Scribner,. March 13, 1973-
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holding all classes after A:00 p.m. and welcoming the
disadvantaged without the means and confidence to go to
college. It would be, in Scribner's view, non-elitist
education available to all within the State of Vermont.
He urged that the concept be initiated outside the estab-
lished higher education system, but acknowledged that it
would eventually need to become part of that system to
give it credibility and to allow people to gain access
to further education and training.
Scribner was particularly opposed to the notion of
initiating a program completely apart from the educational
mainstream
; still, he wanted it to be unique enough to set
an example as a new way of educating people and able to
preserve its distinctive role, even after eventual ac-
ceptance into the system. Resistance was, of course, an-
ticipated, but the Commission felt that if a few people
could serve as models to prove the efficacy of such an
alternative, some stereotypes about what education is,
and what it should be, might be changed.
Governor Davis appointed a Vermont Regional Com-
munity College Commission (VRCCC) in August 1970 to dem-
onstrate the feasibility of the concept. Its goal was
predicated on the belief that education at the post-
secondary level could respond to and reach the needs of
the consumer through the utilization and coordination of
existing resources. The Commission's objective for its
first year of operation was to serve at least 2,000 stu-
dents by June 1972, of which 1,000 would be economically
disadvantaged or would otherwise have no opportunity for
access to higher educational experiences.
The Commission spoke of a policy which welcomed all
adults, regardless of age, economic status, or prior
academic attainment. Curricula were to be individualized
i
allowing the student to design and identify with a program
to meet his own needs. Education obtained via CCV was to
be competency—based with students defining their progress
themselves with the help or a counselor. The College was
prepared, to offer an Associate of Arts degree to those
students demonstrating competence in the areas of intel-
lectual, social, and physical and manual competence. Stu-
dents would also have the option of obtaining a certificate
after obtaining eight competencies if they did not choose
to seek the A. A. level with fifteen competencies. Grades
were not to be given for course work; instead, credit would
be awarded if the student wished to participate with the
teacher in an evaluation of his learning. Students could
simply take a course for recreation, curiosity, or self-
fulfillment on a non-credit basis. The VRCCC proposed to
recruit teachers in response to student demands. Teachers
need not be credentialed by degree, but would have to prove
competence in their fields.
From Idea to Implementation
At what point did the concept become operational
and through what process? There was a need to give some
focus to vague objectives and to pre-test the idea. Per-
formance criteria needed to be established and desired
outcomes had to be defined in order to demonstrate success.
There was, in short, a need to do something quickly, and
the first step was to recruit a nucleus of staff, students,
and teachers. Rather than expend time and energy in elab-
orate designs and needs assessments, planning occurred as
a result of action, allowing the Commission to also test
and demonstrate the demand for its educational services.
The remarkably rapid implementation of the regional com-
munity college concept was due to the availability of
Office of Economic Opportunity funds from Washington and
the personal influence of several state officials sup-
52portive of the idea.
^Kinsey, "Case of the Community College of Vermont"
(Chapter III).
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There was, from the beginning
•>
an awareness of the
political environment in which this 1 Ledgling program had
to be nurtured. A unique lunction for the new community
college had to be convincingly articulated to avoid charges
of duplication of services. The burdensome machinery of
higher education also had to be avoided, but at the same
time not alienate it in order to develop a useful relation-
ship with the State Board of Higher Education, which would
ultimately monitor the academic suitability of the new
program. This was a new college with new ideas, not one
which had a tradition to carry it through criticism and
opposition; it had to survive on its accomplishments, and
simply could not afford to make too many mistakes.
The timing for a community college proposal was in-
auspicious as the state was already committed to a $44
million capital investment for its existing state colleges.
The presidents of the state and two-year colleges were
naturally opposed as they saw the likelihood of both money
and students being siphoned off for this experiment at
their expense. Considering the unique and unusual pro-
posals from which CCV was conceived, and its potential
threat to established ways of educating people, it is
amazing that CCV obtained so much early political support.
Perhaps one secret to the atypical college's early
acceptance was that it meant different things to different
people; its supporters were not quite sure what they wanted,
and its detractors were not certain Just what it was they
were opposing. The original supporters (the federal Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity) wanted to demonstrate the
feasibility of educating poor, rural adults; the more
liberal social and educational administrators wanted some-
thing that would impact upon the traditional educational
establishment and create conditions leading to positive
change. Those politicians who supported the idea were
pragmatically looking for the best value they could get
for limited state dollars.
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An additional factor contributing significantly to
the survival and growth of the idea was the skillful
leadership provided by Peter Smith during the organiza-
tion's precarious early months. Strong personalities,
as will be noted below, had considerable impact upon the
style and directions of the college. Chief among these
figures is Smith, first Director and currently President
of the Community College of Vermont. He is the son of a
prominent Vermont State Senator, Frederick Smith; he re-
ceived an MAT from Harvard, and is both cosmopolitan and
rustic in his approach to leadership. Smith was an as-
sistant to, and protege of, Harvey Scribner and had also
been director of a storefront school project in Montpelier.
The rather phenomenal success which CCV has enjoyed
in obtaining state, federal, and private funding is due,
in large measure, to Smith's political and public rela-
tions acumen; but it comes as a result of other external
factors as well. Vermont, being a relatively small state,
allows easier access to decision-makers when they need to
be reached. Despite the usual bureaucracy in Montpelier,
Smith had access to many offices of both state officials
and legislators which he used to greatest advantage. For
example, when he heard that the University was also sub-
mitting an application to the Fund for the Improvement of
Post—Secondary Education, he was able, with a little help
from the Governor's office, to emerge as the sole applicant,
and ultimately the recipient of a $750i000 grant. Inter-
estingly enough, it was Smith' s candor which helped the
college attract foundation monies. The Carnegie Fund,
for example, was intrigued by his combination of honesty
and bravado in their New York offices. They sent staff
to Vermont to investigate and within a few weeks announced
a generous grant to CCV of nearly $100,000.
^interview with Charles Parker.
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The injection of outside funds in substantial amounts
was vital in allowing CCV some breathing space to develop
a base for further growth, to collect a constituency of
students and supporters, and to establish a presence
which could not simply be ignored or eliminated. The
fact that the setting was rural without intensely com-
alliances or debilitating racial or ethnic
conflicts also greatly enhanced its likelihood of survival.
Planning for Change
The College went through what it identified as two
basic phases of development. During the first, the staff
identified problems pertinent to the operation of a non-
campus, open-access college with sixty-five students and
a few volunteer teachers beginning in January 1970, in-
tent upon demonstrating that competency-based learning
could be measured and documented. From these results they
would determine which direction to take next. The second
phase (beginning in 1972)
,
included field testing of ideas
generated during phase one, revising operating procedures
based on the experiences and knowledge accumulated to date.
The hope was to begin in the fall 1972 with a trained staff
operating a field-tested model.
Three regional sites were established: (1) Central
Vermont, based in Montpelier (December 1970); (2) Several
small northeastern Vermont towns (spring 1971); (3) South-
eastern Vermont, based in Brattleboro and Springfield (Au-
gust 1971). According to the 1972 Annual Report , approx-
imately 100 students attended during the first trimester
34
and 700 were involved by the fourth trimester.
The central office in Montpelier established on-going
planning and evaluation mechanisms, staff development pro-
grams, teacher support systems, and engaged a variety of
^Community College of Vermont Annual Report, 1972 ,
p. 3.
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consultants to assist in specific technical areas. After
the first year of operation, the central office added
several new positions, including a financial aid officer,
educational program director, staff development director!
cost benefit analyst, and a media coordinator. Despite
the titles, the office would not likely instil much con-
fidence in the hearts of the visitor accustomed to the
more conventional trappings of academia. The tacky as-
sortment of offices above the Montpelier Gas Company on
one of the capitol's side streets is filled with diverse
individuals who hardly fit the professional academic image.
It is as if they are daring "the establishmen t " to pass
judgement on their enterprise solely on the basis of their
outward appearance. The of! ices appear to be temporary
headquarters for a political campaign, not the center of
a statewide college which serves nearly 2,000 students.
CGV has an aura of the Great Society programs of the
1960s about it. Many of its staff are former Peace Corps
or anti-poverty workers who were attracted by the energy
and enthusiasm that the program exudes. The work is all-
consuming and most staff approach it as a noble enterprise,
a mission requiring total involvement.
During its first year of operation, CCV's impetus
v/as largely derived from the fashionable rhetoric of edu-
cational critics of the day. This glib phrasing of what
was right and wrong with American education constituted
the reality in which CCV was formulated and conceptualized.
It was as if this rhetoric needed no justification or ex-
planation as long as it espoused all that was currently
in vogue, e.g., opposition to the educational establish-
ment and in favor of providing education for the poor.
In the fall of 1971, new staff were hired to bring
some semblance of order out of the chaos which comes with
a
M seat-of-the-pants" approach to innovation. Steve Hochs-
child was brought on as a planner and gave Smith some
feeling of control and direction. Robert Fine, a
psychologist from New York City came as Director of
Counseling Services; Laurent Daloz returned from Peace
Corps work overseas to develop learning support systems;
and Thomas Yahn came from The Academy of the Streets in
New York City to coordinate the Southeastern Vermont site.
This marked a shift in style to what could be characterized
as a "professional" approach. Smith surrounded himself
with bright, young unknowns (mostly men) who approached
the task with energy and efficiency. The roles which
these more experienced men eventually came to play within
the program during its incipient stages was to have a sig-
nificant impact on the organization's subsequent develop-
ment .
Although Smith and his early colleagues had little
educational experience, these later additions to the
CCV staff came with skills acquired from other settings
which permitted them to contribute an external reality
factor, to ask useful questions, and to demonstrate that
good intentions are not always so simple to implement.
They were to show that competence and skill were pre-
requisites for any real success, and that it would take
serious, tough-minded people to deal with and overcome
the resistance and pressures to be faced.
Smith was a pragmatic Vermonter who recognized
that Fine's urban experience and Hochschild's planning
background could be very useful, although it was somewhat
risky to bring educated outsiders into a largely provin-
cial environment. While Smith remained unmistakably the
leader of this enterprise , it was Hochschild who provided
him with the information and ideas which were critical in
developing much-needed political and organizational stabil-
ity; and it was Fine who, through more informal means,
facilitated the flow and actual implementation of ideas
through those staff who would ultimately have to make
things work in the field. Daloz began to design learning
8b
programs specifically oriented to the College's Vermont
constituency, and Yahn brought practical field experience.
Smith came to understand the politics of education and
acquired the skills necessary to survive within that com-
plex arena.
Beyond their more oovious contributions in estab-
lishing formal organizational systems for on-going appli-
cation, Fine and Hochschild generated something less
tangible but equally important to CCV 1 s growth—an attitude
that rhetoric and intentions were not sufficient in this
business if it was to succeed. They acted, in a sense,
as devil s advocates, forcing the staff to scrutinize them-
selves, their ideas, and their behaviors, to function as
professionals rather than "do-gooders;" in short, to edu-
cate themselves as they set, about the task of providing
education to others.
What Hochschild first heard and saw was creative
chaos held together by blind optimism, incessant rhetoric,
a feeling of omnipotence without any realistic sense of
the awesomeness of the task and the limitations which had
to be faced. The euphoria which comes from the idealistic
notion that anything can happen because the idea is good
and people are committed to it did not conceal the fact
that this was an immature organization.
Hochschild' s effectiveness as a planner was seri-
ously impaired by the lack of professional identity, values,
and methods on the part of less experienced staff for whom
goals of social and academic reform substituted for more
specific objectives. Staff felt they knew all that was
needed to work well with people; and they viewed with sus-
picion anything relating to planning, management, organi-
zation, and educational policy. Not only was there little
awareness of what they wanted and how to accomplish it;
^interview with Hochschild, February 27, 1975*
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but they did not know what to expect of each other, did
not realize the effect of their behavior upon the or-
ganization, and had little self-discipline or patience
for developing necessary skills.'56 Their vision of un-
limited possibilities as reflected in the rhetoric of re-
form and commitment was actually a cover for lack of stra-
tegy and skills.
What was necessary, as Hochschild saw it, was to
play the role of manager before he could be an effective
planner. A climate and framework for planning and decision-
making could only be built as the staff began to under-
stand what the program was about; thus, he concentrated
initially upon operational planning rather than policy
planning (i.e., operationalizing rhetorical objectives).^
Effective program management was a prerequisite for helping
staff appreciate the need to provide quality education if
CCV was to survive. Hochschild recognized that he could
not plan for the future without a solid organizational
basis from which to. begin. He worked hard to see that
planning, problem solving, and performance were taken very
seriously in order to move CCV from idealism to profes-
sionalism. He pushed for more skilled staff, willing to
be disciplined and self-critical, and able to tolerate
structure and system in the operation. Hochschild saw
the program simply taking the path of least resistance
and greatest opportunity, without a clear sense of direc-
tion and purpose. He was able to get Smith to recognize
that educational planning could be useful to alleviate,
or at least reconcile, pressures from the external environ-
ment, and thus allow more deliberate choices about the future.
The crucial importance of the managerial role in this
educational enterprise began to be recognized when late in
1971 Smith declared a temporary moratorium on new contracts
^Hochschild, "Project Thesis Report," (Harvard Uni-
versity, 1972), p. 7.
^ 7 Ibid., p. 11.
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to allow time to focus upon internal planning and develop-
ment. It was at this point that Hochschild began to sense
real progress toward professional development which could
lead to sound decisions, based on specific objectives
and derived from a realistic set of alternatives. The
staff gradually came to realize the folly of overextended
commitments which could not be fulfilled and the damaging
consequences for its students. Rational policy began to
replace activities generated by chance.
Workshops were held and staff began to feel as if
some expertise was now being developed which would help
improve upon what had begun as a rather impetuous intru-
sion into the business of providing people with a com-
munity college where none had existed before. Managers
seeing themselves as a team was a significant step; as
Hochschild described it: "The organization began to take
charge of itself rather than letting the dynamics of
chance and the paths of least resistance control the develop-
58
ment of the organization."'
The realities of organizat ional life which Hochschild
imposed upon the staff were uncomfortable, gave rise to
insecurities, and developed some resentment. It was a
generally depressing period as people finally were forced
to come to grips with organizational inadequacies. ' But
intergroup and interpersonal problems had to be acknow-
ledged and individual adjustments had to be made to allow
for effective planning and managerial techniques. Behav-
ioral problems could not simply be resolved by changing
the organizational environment because those behaviors
were a very real part of that environment; both had to be
improved simultaneously. Generating awareness among staff
of their strengths and weaknesses in developing an
^Hochschild
,
"Project Thesis Report," (Part II),
p . 16 .
^Ibid.
,
p. 18 .
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organization required not only technical skills on the
part of an educational planner, but also group process skills
as well. Hochschild estimated that his planning functions
at CCV depended largely upon process skills and only mini-
mally on more technical planning devices, because he first
had to generate an awareness of planning and a commitment
to it before even very basic techniques could be applied.^
Hochschild points out that the development of new
systems or changes in existing ones are not necessarily
implemented with less resistance in newer programs with-
out well-established structures because even in these,
staff bring their own antitraditional biases and habits
which are not always matched by skills necessary to run
41
an organization. To impart new knowledge and gradually
bring about attitudinal change is relatively easy, but to
develop changes in individual behavior is significantly
more difficult and time-consuming. The implementation of
group changes to effect improved organizational perfor-
42
mance is the most difficult task of all.
Through the active presence of a skilled planner,
CGV’s staff evolved from a group without a sense of respon-
sibility to each other or for achieving any level of per-
formance as an organization, to what Hochschild was able
to accurately describe (after two years) as a program which
"...takes itself more seriously now because we know
what we have done and we now have more of a sense of re-
sponsibility towards our performance and a greater con-
fidence about determining the outcome of our activities
and energies. The key was beginning at the need level
^Hochschild, "Final Analysis, Project Thesis Report,
p. 5-
A|' 1 Ibid., p. 2.
^2Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard, Management of
Organizational Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), P- 5-
^Hochschild , "Project Thesis Report," (Part II),
p . ^6
.
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of the people within the organization, focusing on the
processes by which they could change themselves, in-
creasing their capacity to recognize the realities of
the organization, and ultimately being able to control
its development. Non-formal education, to be effective,
requires formal procedures.
Organizational Development
While Hochschild continued to design new systems,
Fine worked to translate these into action by getting site
staff to maintain commitments once these had been agreed
upon. It was important that new ideas not outdistance
new behavior too rapidly lest good intentions be lost some-
where between a planning session in Montpelier and the ride
back to the site office where daily problems had to again
be faced. While some site staff may have resented the
presence of these "heavies," they still sensed that their
help was necessary to make things work. Fine believes those
willing to learn remain today as the backbone of the re-
gional sites; those who insisted upon operating a program
4-4-
on rhetoric have long since gone. It was during this
critical period that CCV began to display organizational
maturity which gradually led to increased educational
soundness and stability.
Smith admits that he was not fully aware of the im-
portance of these people to the program at the time and
how much impact they would eventually have on hirn and the
organization. Much of their early work, in fact, was
actually too sophisticated and premature for the fledgling
program to utilize effectively. A degree-granting struc-
ture and learning support system initially developed by
Daloz were not used until later when CCV became part of
^Interview with Fine, February 20, 1975-
^interview with Smith, February 14, 1975-
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the state system. (In fact, some of these early proposals
continue to be refined and have yet to be fully implemented.)
Because it is a non-campus, community-oriented insti-
tution seeking to establish credibility and economic sta-
bility, CCV has, perhaps of necessity, been forced to ex-
pend considerable energy in solving operational problems,
trusting that its educational goals would demand less at-
tention, at least initially. special effort has gone into
improving and stabilizing operations in the College's three
regional sites. lhe intent o.f CC\f's statewide organiza-
tional plan was to have decentralized authority that would
allow responsiveness to local needs, yet permit ,joint ac-
tivity with a centralized body that maintained overall
responsibility for coordination of the College's services
and activities.
The Community College's approach to the diffusion of
its services is characterized by a "proliferation of centers"
model. This structure is based upon primary and secondary
centers in which the primary one sunports and maintains
the secondary ones which are engaged in the actual diffusion
of CCV ' s services. The effect of this arrangement is to
enhance the impact of the diffusion process to an exponen-
tial degree as each secondary outer serves, in effect, to
proliferate the whole system with the benefit of the training,
monitoring, and support systems which eminate from the cen-
4- 47ter.
Staff at each regional site are directed and supported
by a coordinator with previous experience in some aspect of
educational planning or administrat ion . For the most Dart,
however, other regional staff bring less experience to the
,job. Some are casualties of other federal programs; others
are enrollees of various work-training programs. This
^Kinsey, "Case of the Community College of Vermont"
(Chapter IV).
/+
^See Donald Schon, Beyond, the Stable State , for a
discussion of this model.
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arrangement is, of course, advantageous to CCV; hiring as
many non-professional staff as possible puts less strain
on personnel budgets. This economy could be questioned
though, if unskilled staff charged with management or
counseling duties are themselves in a trainee status and
are dependent upon close guidance and supervision.
Those staff members who tend to be more candid with
outsiders and more honest with themselves are a bit amused
and even somewhat overwhelmed by the vast amount of atten-
tion which CCV continually attracts. It seems that not
a month goes by without visitors or some publication of
national scope alluding to this exciting and unique edu-
cational experiment taking place in the Green Mountains
of Vermont. In the daily turmoil of their motley offices,
CCV staff are proud and pleased with themselves that, as
non-professionals with relatively little organizational
experience, they can still manage to do virtually every-
thing that needs doing to run a college, even though each
semester they have a nearly new student body and faculty.
They complain, though, about chronic inefficiency
caused by the lack of established procedure and the lack
of essential office equipment. Routine chores result in
minor crises because regularly repeated tasks are not, in
fact, routinized. It is as if each semester, old tasks are
approached with new confusion and uncertainty about the
best way of doing them. The norm of functioning in a
state of philosophical and procedural anarchy frustrates
many staff who are concerned with quality control, which
they see as essential for ultimate survival.
One staff member made the interesting comment that
the very elements that constitute the real strength of
CCV—access, flexibility, concern .for people—are precisely
those which, in excess, become the program's chief weaknesses.
Interviews sith site staff members. This reluctance
to establish regular patterns of activity is similar to the
general staff attitude within UWW.
With no external reality test to rely upon, the staff fancy
themselves as being involved in an outstanding educational
experiment, while at the same time being plagued with self-
doubts that it could be just another facade of reform. Some
site staff who were interviewed did not conceal their an-
noyance with what they describe as the organization's re-
luctance to be tied to firm statements or positions in
certain key areas of policy and procedure. Currently,
local staff develop their own parochial philosophy and ex-
pedient methods for operationalizing it, even if that phi-
losophy and methodology are subject to modification with
each new semester (as is the case at UWW).
President Smith maintains that CCV operates on an
increasingly formal basis with new written policies and
procedures that rely less on a "buddy" system than in the
past. Smith is frustrated, though, that some staff are
generally oblivious to the organization's newer and more
official format, preferring to continue to operate in
more informal ways. He wants to establish precedents,
commit history to writing, and systematize procedures.^
Part of his purpose in this regard is to standardize the
operation and make it less dependent upon him personally.
While some site staff lean toward familiar solutions
proven elsewhere to respond to student needs, central staff
prefer to spend more time developing different ways to do
the same things. Herein lies a basic difference in the
way site and central office staff approach similar prob-
lems. Site people feel the immediacy of responding to
student needs with concrete, situational solutions, while
central staff are sufficiently removed to be able to af-
ford the luxury of approaching these matters more as ab-
stract problems, whose solutions may have possibilities
for wider application.^
^After 3)4 years of operation, CCV prepared a policy
handbook to increase its organizational clarity in the areas
of management, decision-making, and personnel. The handbook
spells out in non-bureaucratic language, GCV's policies and
procedures
.
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While the regional site staffs have enjoyed their
autonomy and have found strength in their independence
from the central office, they now feel a need for the
College to speak with a collective voice. Now that
they have established a credible presence on their own,
they feel a need to be part of a larger force to consoli-
date their gains and determine a future course. Yet at
the same time, site staff are fearful of becoming caught
up in pursuits of the central office, many of which they
consider tangential to the main business of helping people
learn, e.g., fund-raising and political strategizing.
Central and site staffs operate with different pre-
occupations. At the top, the concern is with decisions
affecting the program's political and economic survival;
at the site level, staff concerns focus around educational
issues and meeting the students' needs rather than those
of the program. Some site staff have slyly commented that
central staff would do well to direct a bit more time and
attention to the regional sites and expend a little less
energy at cultivating their image at national conferences.
One central staff member made a useful analogy by
viewing the program as a wheel with central staff at the
center seeing problems radiating out equally in all direc-
tions as spokes, while site staff are concerned with what
they find at the end of their own spoke. A regional staff
member depicted the difference equally well by distinguishing
between the "contractors"—those who constantly push out
exterior walls for further expansion, and the "interior
designers"—those who are concerned with improving the
appearance and effectiveness of existing structures.
Another aspect of the program's dual nature is the
tension caused by staff needs fora spontaneous, unstruc-
tured, non-hierarchical organization and a need, on the
^Interviews with central and site staff.
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other hand, for leadership and established procedures which
permit tasks to be completed more efficiently. While cite
staff pride themselves on their informal approach to get-
ting the job done, they are at the same time aware that
there exists a state of perpetual confusion. One semester
will find a high degree of duplicated effort prompting
staff to agree to a more effective division of labor, only
to discover that this specialization brings on feelings of
individual isolation, a sense of not knowing what everybody
else is doing, and a lessened espri t de corps
.
Still another issue among staff is that of core fa-
culty. The "liberals" balk at the very idea of faculty
and all its overtones of a traditional academic institu-
tion. They like the notion of rotating faculty recruited
from the community who inject vitality at a bargain price.
And, of course, the absence of faculty in residence at the
site level eliminates a potentially conservative force which
could antagonize the innovators, particularly if the latter
are unresponsive to local needs. The "conservatives" (again,
generally those at the site level) are frustrated at having
*
to help design students' programs in academic disciplines
with which they have little familiarity and at having to
assess the merit and appropriateness of proposed new courses
each semester without benefit of some expertise in those
fields. Their suggested solution is to employ, as staff
or consultants, faculty in those areas of primary student
interest; e.g., social sciences, humanities, natural sci-
ences, human services, etc.
^Faculty were not paid for their services during
the first two years of operation, but the College contends
that this in no way has limited the calibre of persons they
can attract to teach. It remains to be seen it the stipend
($225 for a fifteen-week course) now paid to instructors
will significantly affect the type of resource persons the
College is able to attract. During the fall 197 Z! term, . ,4
percent of CCV's teachers completed a questionnaire designed
to provide information for a self-study currently underway to
receive final accreditation. While close to hall also teach
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The gap between central and site staffs reflects the
disparity between invention and maintenance, innovation and
stability, change and consistency. Central staff would like
to think that their current program development efforts are
aimed at refining earlier inventions, producing changes
which are cumulative and. constructive. Site staff tend to
see this activity as more random and opportunistic; they
wish to make earlier inventions work better, to codify more
and innovate less.
The strains of development, both from external and
internal sources, have been great and it is to Smith's
credit that these ambitious and diverse individuals were
able to sustain a cohesive effort reflecting a unique blend
of formal and non—formal approaches. At the same time,
they have avoided the temptation to become a separate edu-
cational cult that could easily have become impervious to
external influence and, in turn, totally ineffective at
promoting educational change elsewhere.
The Politics of Innovation
The College's early acceptance may be attributed to
several factors. One of these is a curious brand of Ver-
mont populism which, with its mixture of conservative and
progressive attitudes, has long fostered a climate for
tolerating educational experimentalism
.
(CCV had innova-
tive predecessors in Bennington, Marlboro, and Goddard
long before.) Another aspect of this tolerance may have
been the attitude that such a proposal, with only a nine-
month demonstration grant from 0E0
,
was doomed to failure
anyway, and was not worth fighting. As Smith himself con-
cedes, "Nobody cared enough then to stick their own necks
52
out to try and put us out of business."' The real key to
at an institution other than CCV, 42$ are teaching for the
first time. Just under 2/5 have some form of teacher cer-
tification and 55$ have a Masters or professional degree.
"Community College of Vermont Newsletter," (Spring, 1975).
^Interview with Smith, February 20, 1975-
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success, though, was the availability of sizeable amounts
of venture capital (an additional $4-96,000 from 0E0 for*
three years) which allowed. Smith some financial security
while learning how to develop a system which could work
before having to go to the Vermont State Legislature and
private sources for more money.
With its rather special status, GCV has been able
to prosper from its relative autonomy as well as its
built-in accountability to the educational and political
establishment. By maintaining contact with key individuals
and institutions, Smith became sensitive enough to do and
say the right things to the appropriate people at the op-
portune time. Particularly helpful to him in this regard
have been William Craig and Allan Weiss. Craig has re-
mained generally supportive of Smith and the program, and
he serves as a useful buffer between CCV and the other
state colleges. Weiss, with his political sensitivity and
sound educational theory, has been helpful to Smith in al-
ways knowing the right way to introduce and insinuate CCV
into the system with the minimum risk and the greatest
likelihood for success.
If anyone can be said to have played a pivotal role
in shepherding the fledgling institution, it is perhaps
Allan Weiss, who was a charter member of the College's
State Board and served as its second chairman. More im-
portantly, he played the role of advisor and devil's ad-
vocate, forcing Smith and staff constantly to make choices
and narrow the parameters between myth and reality. He
also helped the College's staff and Board grapple with
’^William Craig was formerly President of Johnson
State College and the first Chairman of the CCV Board. Cur-
rently, he is Chancellor of the Vermont State Colleges sys-
tem. Allan Weiss was formerly Superintendent of Schools in
Montpelier and is currently Deputy Commissioner of Educa-
tion in Vermont.
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the issue of whether it should be geared exclusively to tho
who were caught between high school and the state colleges.
It should be mentioned, in this regard, that Thomas
Hahn, an anti-poverty leader in 'the northeast region of
Vermont
,
who was seen by many as an adversary of the Com-
munity College, also played an extremely influential role
by forcing the Board to examine closely and cautiously its
roles and approaches v i
s
—
a—v i
s
the poor. By utilizing his
influence with legislators in Montpelier, community leaders
in northeastern Vermont, and federal agencies in Boston,
Hahn was in a strategic position to intimidate the College's
Advisory Board with the prospect of losing its broad-based
support and funding. With Hahn as a gadfly representing
the low-income constituency, the College approached the
question of whom to serve and how to serve them less rhe-
torically and more pragmatically. The result was a streng-
thened system more responsive and sensitive to the task of
providing education for the poor.
The program's staff and allies recognized early that
credibility would, be crucial to survival, given the realities
of the political economy of higher education in the state.
CCV needed to generate data both to provide internal feed-
back to its staff and to instil confidence in its public.
Systematic planning and academic accountability had to be
demonstrated to conservative skeptics accustomed to more
conventional programs. Commission members rallied and
spoke positively, although not very specifically, of the
program's accomplishments. One notable advocate was
State Senator Frederick Smith, who provided strong sun-
port for the program headed by his son, saying that in all
the studies which have been done on the Commission, "No-
body's said a bad word about: what they're doing, or the
way they're trying to do it."
^Interview with Weiss, March 14, 1975-
n
w
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In May 1972, the Commission received the first of
several positive written endorsements which came in rapid
succession. After what was termed a "rigorous" two-da.y
visit (May 8-9, 1972), a visiting team to VRCCC released
its report attesting to the fact that "a dedicated and
professional staff have shown social sensitivity and
demonstrated a remarkable level of achievement in coordinat
mg and utilizing existing resources." 56 Although it was
felt that they had yet to operationalize some of the edu-
cational services as had previously been theoretically de-
signed, the team nonetheless declared that VRCCC had ac-
complished what they set out to do. The financial report
accompanying the team's report stated that financial evi-
dence overwhelmingly supported the Commission as a viable
method for extending higher education, adding that it must
provide at least one-half of its budget from tuition reve-
nues upon termination of the 0E0 grant. The Report con-
cluded with the recommendation that VRCCC become part of
87the Vermont State Colleges. '
These studies were specifically designed to generate
public support. Those who became identified with the Col-
lege were carefully selected; not only was it important to
have persons who were sympathetic to the program, but in
addition, they needed to understand what it was all about
in order to convey its value to those who were more skepti-
cal of newer educational trends in general and of the new
55Rutland (Vt.) Herald
,
March 4, 1972.
^"Report of the Visiting Team to Vermont Regional
Community College Commission," (May 1972).
55 A minority report pointed out a number of short-
comings of the program which the visiting team had apparently
overlooked or dismissed as insignificant. Difficiencies
cited were a lack of career and vocationally oriented courses,
a lack of courses which appealed to the disadvantaged, courses
offered which could hardly be granted high school credit, and
course outlines presented which were not, in fact, the courses
which were taught.
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Community College in particular. Valuable political
mileage was gained from the on-site evaluation; it served
as a counterforce to the resistance that was mounting from
legislators who feared the financial consequences and from
traditional educators with the attitude that existing in-
stitutions could meet any existing educational needs. More
to the point, neither legislators nor educators were prob-
ably convinced that all needs were being met, but they pre-
ferred to leave them unmet rather than allow the Community
College to demonstrate (and thus create) needs which it
could then claim could be adequately met only by the new
Community College approach as its studies suggested.
A cost-benefit analysis was prepared and released
in December 1972 for the expressed purpose of providing
information for selecting the most economic alternative
for additional higher education services in Vermont. Speci-
fically, the analysis presented evidence demonstrating the
feasibility of state funding for the Community College.
This cost-benefit analysis did not limit itself solely
to judging the economic merits of CCV ; it also indulged in
a complimentary summation of the program's social, intel-
lectual, and economic benefits to the state. The College
was described as a unique higher education structure which
did not duplicate existing services, nor serve the same
clientele of other institutions.
The study went on to state that an educated public
tends to attract industry and have a positive effect on
the local economy. Other social benefits were outlined,
including the claim that the Community College offered a
unique way to acquire higher education and, therefore, pro-
vided a realistic route out of poverty. The largest
^During its first fiscal year, CCV enrolled 750 stu-
dents in its courses with an operating budget of $207,000.
The next year its budget was $4-20,000 and its enrollment
was at 1,200 students. In contrast, $14- million was es-
timated to be the cost of constructing a physical plant
suitable to serve 1,000 students by 1980. Kinsey, Case
of Community College of Vermont" (Chapter IX).
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student population was identified as low-income individuals
with minimal educational backgrounds and with no access to
other educational facilities. Figures cited identified
35% of the program's students as low-income, 71% with no
other opportunities, and 14# as having no high school
diploma. Statistics also revealed that 72% were interested
in learning new skills.
^
It was emphasized that a large percentage of the
budget was directly related to teaching, with little paid
for research and consultation. A critical need for more
counseling personnel was identified; this service, in
fact, represented the largest single staff expense (ten
counselors were considered ideal for each site of 1,000
students). It was proposed that revenues to meet these
expenses could be generated through contracts to provide
educational and training services, and augmented by other
grants, and student tuition.
The report concluded by presenting the alternatives
available to the state for providing higher education to
more residents: (1) expand existing public facilities;
(2) construct other campus-based public institutions;
(3) fund existing private institutions; or (4) fund the
Community College of Vermont. The last option was offered
as the most feasible financial alternative to the high
cost of education. This fiscal rationale, plus the social
benefits discussed, were presented as significant justifi-
cation for state funding. At this point in CCV's history,
economically persuasive arguments were essential, while
educational ones were useful.
While the Vermont State Legislature was in session
from January through April 1973 , the Community College
made a concerted effort to secure financial support from
the state, claiming that the lack of the requested $50,000
appropriation would make it virtually impossible to attract
^Charles Parker, Community College of Vermont Cost
Benefit Analysis, 1972, p. 16.
102
matching funds (necessary for survival and growth) from
private sources. Although many legislators were skeptical
of the College fearing that it would develop into a costly
fifth state college, enough of them were persuaded that it
was at least cheaper than another campus-based college.
The appropriation was passed on April 4, 1973.
The following year, CCV requested $300,000 from the
Vermont State Legislature. Peter Smith claimed that goals
for 19/4 could not be met and one of its three sites would
have to be closed if funds were not appropriated. Smith
pointed out that state support in the amount of $300,000
out of a total budget of $770,000 was not a lot in return
for what he called inexpensive, grass roots education de-
signed for low and moderate income working Vermonters.
The generally conservative law-makers responded to the
request by passing a state appropriation of $173,000.
By late 1974
*
with CCV firmly established as an in-
tegral part of the state college system, Chancellor Wil-
liam Craig budgeted $600,000 for CCV from his nearly $3
million request for the state colleges. It is likely that
CCV's portion of the appropriation will be preserved for
its use despite the escalating competition between the
colleges for these scarce resources.
The College's comet-like growth, while encouraging
to its advocates and motivating to its staff, still cannot
be characterized simply as an example of smooth, evolu-
tionary development. From its initial grant, to the rapid
establishment of its three regional sites, the awarding
of substantial private grants, the success story effect
of the Visiting Team Report, eventual acceptance by the
state system, and financial support from the state, there
have been pauses and plateaus, and periods of instability.
At each of these junctures Smith was able to compensate
for what he may have lacked in organizational ability by
capitalizing on his innate political astuteness and, most
importantly, his willingness to seek advice and guidance
both from within and beyond the organization.
Rhetoric and Reality
In response to a request for information about the
College from the Vermont legislature in the fall 1975,
CCV staff prepared a document called Community College of
Vermont: Product and Progress which appeared in January 1974 .
It was an effort to show the College's impact on its stu-
dents and the state through the gathering of information
by questionnaires administered to two-hundred students
and a review of the program's records.
A distinction was made between respondents who were
first-term students and those who were continuing students
at the time the questionnaire was mailed. Fifty-five per-
cent of the new students felt that CCV was an excellent
program, while 40% of the continuing students gave it the
same rating. Twenty-one percent of the new students in-
dicated that they could have done the same college work if
CCV was not available to them, but only 3% of the continuing
students replied in the affirmative. Twenty-six percent of
the new students planned to seek a certificate or degree
from CCV as did 70% of the continuing students.^ Their
responses suggest that many continuing students who have
had more prolonged contact with CCV, and thus may recog-
nize certain weaknesses or limitations in the program,
give it less than an excellent rating. Nonetheless, they
feel that it is their only real option for further educa-
tion, and they are strongly committed to obtaining a degree
from CCV despite any obstacles or frustrations which may
exist
.
CCV's Annual Report for 1974 highlighted the following
statistics: From the fall 1973 through spring 1974, 2,120
individuals were enrolled, of which 84.8% were considered
to be from the target population. Nearly thirty-five per-
cent were continuing CCV students and 65-9 percent were
^Community College of Vermont: Product and Progress
( January 197*0, pp. 2-4.
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employed full or part-time. A survey of the fifty-seven
CCV graduates as of the spring 1974 indicated that about
twenty-five percent had continued their education in some
fashion (nearly all in Vermont), and sixty-three percent
are employed with an average starting salary of $6, 800. 61
To substantiate its claims of effectiveness and
responsiveness, the College has made skillful use of sur-
veys and needs assessments which accentuate the inadequacy
of existing resources for meeting educational aspira-
tions of Vermonters. In 1973, the Vermont State Colleges
provided research funds to the Community College to under-
take a series of research studies dealing with access to
post-secondary education. Research concluded to date has
investigated the educational aspirations of Vermont high
school students and adults. The findings indicate a wide
disparity between a high school student's aspirations to
attend some form of post-secondary education (68.9 percent)
and his actual enrollment and continuation into such edu-
r p
cation (49 percent). Obviously, there are many social
obstacles to access which are not necessarily attributable
to low aspirations of individuals.
Findings of the "Adult Aspiration Study" further
revealed that a high number of Vermonters' educational
needs are not being met, particularly those with employ-
ment-related aspirations. Also, as adults' educational
aspirations increase, their needs are less likely to be
met, particularly those adults who "postponed" their post-
secondary education rather than continued immediately af-
ter high school. It was also revealed that low-income
people are willing to spend a higher proportion of their
^ Community College of Vermont Annual Report 1974, p.
62Hochschild and Johnston, "Vermont Adult Aspiration
Study" (1973), p. 1.
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income for post-secondary education than other adults.
There was a strong demand for a wide diversity of educa-
tional programs and educational counseling services to be
locally based and readily available
In a report submitted to Chancellor of Education
William Craig noting fall 1974 statistics, CCV cited the
following: 1,687 individuals were served in six counties
(an increase of over 750 from the previous fall); of these,
72 percent were females, 52.5 percent were between the ages
of 20-29, 2/5 of all students took one course, and 20 per-
cent of the semester's new students indicated a desire for
a degree after they became clearer about their educational
64goals. Figures released m early 1975 indicated that en-
rollment for spring 1975 reflected a sharp increase over
fall enrollment (almost a 50 percent increase, for ex-
ample, in the southeast site). Of the eighty-three gradu-
ates who have gone on to four-year institutions, their
65
cumulative grade point average is 5«5^*
These statistics seem to offer dramatic evidence of
the growing popularity of the Community College of Vermont
in just over three years. It would appear to be the be-
ginning of a rather successful experiment; one which has
won acceptance, generated financial support, enjoyed
favorable reviews, and is presumably well on its way to
accomplishing its ambitious aims. But, looking beyond
the College's accumulation of reports, evaluations, and
press releases, has this half—million dollar experiment
actually begun to accomplish its educational aims for the
population for whom it was intended to serve? Have its
benefits been as unique or its beneficiaries as well served
as the public has been led to believe?
6
^Hochschild and Johnston, "Vermont Adult Aspiration
Study" (197*0, P- 10 •
^Community College Newsletter (Winter 1975).
^Community College Newsletter (April 1975).
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It is important to kenp in mind that this program was
initially funded with a half-million dollar 0E0 grant to
serve primarily the low-income Vermonter who would not
otherwise have access to higher education opportunities.
Reaching this population and then meeting its needs, par-
t icularly with something as foreign to them as higher edu-
cation, is not a casual task to be undertaken with only
fashionable maxims and lofty praise in hand. Educational
services of this sort can best assist Ihose students who
have a clear perception of the way the program fits their
needs in a non-threatening way, and offers promise of im-
mediate and tangible benefits. Flaking such a program work
in fact as well as in theory reauires extreme social com-
petence and sensitivity.
Some site staff are concerned about the lack of any
substantial numbers of students who are low-income, el-
derly, or young (e.g., high school dropouts). While it is
true that there is a rather heterogenous cross-section of
citizens signing up for CGV courses, the majority are fe-
males, many of whom are housewives in their twenties and
thirties (in 197 '+
1
only 17 percent were males among CCV's
southern Vermont students). Also, a transient, non-in-
digenous population, as well as many college dropouts, are
attracted to liberal arts courses.
But, it is still the low-income student, for whom
the College was primarily established, who remains the
most elusive after three years of operation. Most staff
are not really puzzled by this; they attribute this notice-
able lack to the simple fact that CCV has never concentrated
upon outreach as an integral function of the College.
Area social service agencies are asked to assist with out-
reach by mentioning the availability of CCV to their clients,
and Saturday morning information sessions are occasionally
held. But outreach in the true sense of the word—reaching
out into the community— is only recently beginning to take
place. Not only does the budget not allow for outreach
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workers, but few staff are themselves from low-income back-
grounds, so they do not feel very confident that they can
easily relate well to lower income persons whom they wish
to attract to the program. CCV's general popularity has
not forced the issue of attracting more low-income students,
but if low-income persons are to be served in any signifi-
cant numbers, effective outreach in collaboration with
other social agencies providing services to this popula-
tion must be established and must be complemented by on-
going counseling
—
personal as well as academic , 66
Who actually has benefited from the presence of GCV?
A perusal of statistics contained in the Annual Report for
1972 shows that thirty-two percent of those attending Com-
munity College courses came from families with incomes
over $9,000, and thirty-six percent had completed two to
four years of college; twenty-four percent came from fami-
lies with incomes under $5i000, and sixteen percent were
r n
high school dropouts. These figures show a respectable
number of low-income and academically disadvantaged Ver-
monters taking advantage of the program; and yet, because
it was primarily for this group that the program was ori-
ginally aimed, the relatively high percentage of students
in upper income brackets with previous academic attainment
cannot be overlooked.
^A recent survey of Community College teachers high-
lighted the crucial need for expert counseling to militate
against what are frequently overwhelming obstacles to
learning faced by low— income students. Seventy— four per-
cent of the teachers responding felt that home and job
responsibilities of students interfered with their course
work; sixty-two percent felt that inadequate study habits
posed a problem; and sixty percent encountered difficulties
teaching because the range of student abilities was too
great. Community College Newsletter (April 1975)-
6^Community College of Vermont Annual Report 1972 ,
p. 58ff.
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lew figures are ,yet available to indicate who takes
various types of courses, but it is clear that a large num-
ber of low-income students take courses aimed at enhancing
their chances for access into human service work at para-
professional levels. While this is worthwhile occupational
training, many are ultimately barred from licensing or cer-
tification because they lack additional academic credentials
deemed nec-essary for occupational recognition.
Low-income persons are more likely to take courses
to prepare for new dobs than for the purpose of advancing
in their present dobs . They are also less likely than the
middle-class citizen to take advantage of personal enrich-
ment courses such as photography, guitar, Jewelry making,
etc.^ Those who enjoy a certain amount of economic security
can also enjoy the luxury of such courses while low-income
persons who lead a marginal economic existence desperately
need training and education to become betteh equipped to
compete in the Job market.
innovation: Real or Imagined?
In attempting to place CCV along the continuum be-
tween a non-traditional program serving non-trad it ional
students and a traditional program serving traditional
students, an appropriate position is elusive. CGV can,
first of all, be categorized as non-traditional when
^Thirty-five nercent of GGV' s students responded
that they were taking courses for personal enrichment,
and twenty-five percent said they were attending to learn
skills toward upgrading in their current Jobs. A listing
of courses for the 1971-72 academic year showed that
courses were divided approximately equally into liberal
arts (history, English, social sciences, etc.;, ski s
training (e.g., preparation for para-professional .jobs
in human service work), and personal enrichment, Gom-
rnunity Gollege of Vermont Annual Report 1 ;L_2»
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consider its organizational profile. Yet, it cannot safely
be assumed, in turn, that the actual classroom teaching con-
ducted under its auspices is necessarily non-tradit ional
.
In fact, the majority of its teachers, though recruited from
the community, usually bring some previous teaching experi-
ence from rather conventional institutions. And while they
may expect this rather unconvent ional program to attract
atypical students, what they may in fact find facing them
at the first class session is a cross-section of students
who are apt to be nearly identical to those enrolled in the
closest traditional community or state college and who have
the same traditional expectations of what college is and
does
.
A discrepancy then, would seem to exist between the
program's rhetoric which speaks of a competency-based,
process-oriented curriculum, and many of its teachers who
ply their conventional academic wares via traditional modes
of instruction. The program, in espousing new approaches
to learning to maintain its innovative status, tends to put
pressure on its teachers and students who are not yet ready
to assimilate what they see as radical departures from the
kind of schooling to which they have been exposed and with
which they are most comfortable.
If most of CGV ' s students have conventional needs
for learning and many of its teachers have conventional
styles of teaching, where is the latitude for experimenta-
tion and negotiation in the learning process? While the
bulk of CCV's activity consists of its many regular class-
room-oriented offerings in response to general public in-
terest, it is in the area of degree contracting with con-
tinuing students where traditional needs and innovative
means are most effectively amalgamated. If larger numbers
of people make the commitment to degree programs, CGV will
be forced to invest increasing resources in its learning sup-
port services. This increased emphasis on degree programs
offers perhaps the best opportunity to devise new structures
and systems to meet the traditional needs of students.
no
Until now, however, the actual delivery of learning
services has been quite traditional, characterized by the
familiar teacher and student in the classroom. The Col-
lege has not yet really engaged in much experimentation,
and is only now beginning to encourage new teaching; and
learning approaches (for example, alternative forms of
credent ialing)
. GGV
' s non-t rad it ional character, then,
seems to be contained less in its specific learning ap-
proaches and appears more a function of style and tone in
the way it responds to its students' needs (e.g., CGV ' s
lack of structure safeguards it from appearing to be a
conventional college, while at the same time offering
some assurance that it is accessible and responsive).
When the question of its most distinguishing fea-
ture is raised, staff respond almost universally that CCV
is, in every sense of the word, a real community college,
utilizing human and physical resources at hand in the com-
munity, and attempting to respond to the needs of the com-
munities where it exists. The concept is appealing but it
is difficult to determine if GGV really has grafted itself
onto the cities and towns where it operates. Some staff
readily admit that there is more of a passive acceptance
or tolerance of GGV' s presence than a genuine harmony of
college and community.
Site staff acknowledge that progress has been slow
in gaining the cooperation of very many local social and
educational organizations which preceded them. The staff
was young, few were professional educators, many were
trainees learning on the job, and a few were simply inept
at developing a role in the social service field where com-
petition for credibility, clients, and cash is intense. Be-
cause of these limitations in the size and skill of regional
staffs, they were usually forced to choose the path of least
resistance and collaborate as much as possible with whoever
was initially most receptive. Where considerable time and
Ill
effort was needed to negotiate mutually beneficial ar-
rangements with another agency, the task was usually post-
poned until after the next crisis could be brought under
control
.
The College's fear of being classified as just another
costly social program may also have discouraged more col-
laborative efforts with local social agencies. As a re-
sult
,
CCV often began alone or with a few individual sup-
porters in a community, rather than joining forces with
groups who may actually have shared similar values and
goals. The cost, in some instances, was loss of contact
with constituencies (particularly low-income people) whom
CCV desperately wanted among its students.
Community support for the CCV concept was generally
difficult to predict; while one area might yield a positive
response from public school officials and a negative reac-
tion from the business community, another would provoke
just the opposite reaction. Site coordinators expended a
good deal of energy trying to dissipate that initial resis-
tance and called upon Smith personally to lay some groundwork
by identifying at least one key supporter within a poten-
tially hostile environment. Smith's "Vermontness" and
his skillful diplomacy have been useful, both in Montpelier
as well as in target communities.
A substantial investment of staff time and energy
has gone into achieving detente with local public school
systems. In Montpelier and Springfield, CCV sites have
moved their base of operation into local school systems.
This has been prompted by the need for establishing greater
credibility as an educational program within the community
by some formal affiliation with local public school sys-
6
^This arrangement raises the question of just how
accessible the College's services then become to persons
for whom the public school conjures up hostile feelings
or rekindles memories of negative experiences.
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Perhaps the most significant feature in the evolu-
tion of the College's educational program in 1975 has been
the development of a "learning support system." After
approximately a year and a half of providing a variety of
courses, the College staff realized that they would per-
haps do nothing more than offer a potpourri of unrelated
courses to people who would feel no closer to obtaining
more training, a better job, or a degree. Helping a num-
ber of individuals scattered across the state accumulate
a few college credits did not seem to be establishing a
precedent or model for bringing significant post-secondary
learning experiences to Vermonters. For many, a course or
two became a terminal exercise to fill an empty evening
during the winter months. With weak academic backgrounds,
jobs, and families to drain their energies, and little or
no encouragement from anyone, few students had any aspira-
tions that the Community College could be a realistic
avenue to a degree.
^
The new emphasis was significant because it suggested
that CCV now recognized that merely its presence in a com-
munity was not sufficient to attract and benefit indivi-
duals for anything more than one personally enriching
evening course per semester. To assist citizens in ac-
quiring cumulative learning experiences which will measur-
ably affect their economic status as well as their personal
development, far greater planning and attention is required
in designing personalized learning programs with strengthened
supportive services. Isolated courses in psychology, art,
and women's rights may be enjoyable, but will not likely do
as much as a well-organized sequence of courses leading to
new skills, credentials, and job bargaining power for a
low-income working mother aspiring to greater job security
to support her children.
7°In 1972, only fourteen percent of CCV '
s
students
expressed any intention of pursuing a degree program. CCV
Annual Repor't-1972 , p. 60.
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The College has begun to develop a student support
staff to assist students in designing learning plans that
include a comprehensive course of study, leading to a
set of goals or a contract to be completed. It is hoped
that, with this more intensive, on-going support to stu-
dents, more students will develop confidence and motiva-
tion to acquire an associate degree from the College,
rather than select courses at random.
As more students became interested in working toward
a degree, three programs were developed: human services,
general studies, and administrative services. Although
the degree is comparable to a normal two-year degree, the
process is different. Rather than award the degree after
an established number of courses or credits, the degree is
awarded upon completion of the student's contract which
addresses individually designed learning objectives ap-
propriate to the particular program area. A group of
community resource people, known as the local review com-
mittee, meets regularly with the student to provide guid-
ance and recommend awarding of the degree.
• In June 1973 , Community College awarded its first
associate degrees in human services to eight students, fol-
lowed by twenty-nine more graduates with A. A. degrees in
March 197% The learning support system, which permits
students to design their own learning programs with con-
tinual guidance in their daily real-life settings,
has clearly been a significant innovation increasing the
College's capacity to attract potential degree candidates
and ultimately graduate them.
Still, despite their student-centered approach, CCV
has experienced its share of difficulty in maintaining the
interest of large numbers of students to pursue a degree-
oriented program. This is particularly so for lower in-
come students whomthe College is attempting to serve.
When it was decided to charge voluntary tuition fees to
assist in paying stipends to teachers beginning in fall 197%
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there was concern that economically disadvantaged students
would be discouraged from participating. Even without
tuition costs, the daily financial strain on low- or
fixed-income families is debilitating when added to the
litany of insecurities and domestic travails which plagued
so many from lower socio-economic segments of the community.
The College was awarded $110,000 in federal educa-
tional opportunity grants and $75sOOO from the Noyes Founda-
tion to use as scholarships. With these resources, an
aggressive financial aid program was initiated to facili-
tate access. Paying disadvantaged persons as inducement
to become students, however, might well contribute to the
instability and uncertainty they may already be experiencing.
It may also encourage marginal students to continue after
they have lost interest and learning then become unproduc-
tive drudgery.
One set of goals proposed for 1974 revolved around
the critical area of improving outreach and devising new
programs to attract and retain low access people. It is
curious that this particular focus is recognized and ar-
ticulated as a significant new program emphasis for 1974,
three years after its beginning with 0E0 monies to serve
primarily this very population. Discrepancies of this
sort suggest that, while Community College of Vermont was
initially established for the primary purpose of providing
access to post-secondary education to low-income, non-tra-
ditional, low-access Vermonters, what it has in fact done
most effectively, and perhaps of necessity for the first
three years, has been to offer college-level experiences
to a rather traditional and relatively low-risk student
population
.
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Implications for the Future
When asked to describe the organization's stages of
development, Peter Smith identified four phases: (1) the
Pioneering Phase when nothing was planned or predictable;
(2) the Developmental Phase—when the program had to gen-
erate and demonstrate competence; (5) the Consolidation
Phase—when new learning systems actually had to work; and
( ) the Institutionalization Phase—when CCV became es-
tablished. It does not seem to be at all an inaccurate
description of CCV ' s development. Smith likes to describe
his organization's ability (and his) to effectively respond
to the situation at hand as "chameleon-like."
To- those critics who might consider CCV ' s history as
random, Smith responds that it has been a "situational im-
perative" approach wherein each new development was in res-
ponse to a demonstrated need of a particular situation,
rather than a prediction. To those who would label its
style as opportunistic, Smith insists that CCV has always
been true to its original philosophy of helping people be
responsible for their own learning and its mandate of pro-
viding open access, utilizing available resources, meeting
71immediate needs, and serving low-income people.
Whatever new directions are considered, Smith is ada-
mant about preserving one feature of CCV that is, for him,
a significant key to the College's success to date: its
responsive rather than predictive nature. Rather than pre-
sume to know what is needed, the College has instead shaped
its development around needs as these became evident. But
initiating new programs while managing existing ones, is
a difficult task, and suggests the paradox and likely
conflict to be encountered by the individual who is
^Interview with Smith, November 15, 1974.
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at once responsible for administering on-Coin K programs and
providing innovative leadership for new ones.
Smith rates consistently higher marks as a leader-
innovator than he does as a director-manager. His style
is to dream and scheme, present an idea to the regional
sites, and give them relative freedom of movement to imple-
ment it in ways most appropriate to their particular situ-
ation. He is constantly moving; just when he seems to be
slowing down and running out of ideas, he suddenly surges
ahead again with boyish energy, leaving the details of what
has gone before for others to manage. He is in perpetual
motion and, as a result, so is GCV
. He is likely to take
an idea (e.g., new learning programs) from site staff,
develop it into a marginally feasible format and send it
back to the site offices for implementation. This inevitably
leads to complaints of "top-down" policy despite an organi-
zation which, on the whole, is democratic, almost to the
point of inefficiency with its decision-making teams and
group process.
Smith acknowledges that the excitement and intrigue
of concocting new programs is what maintains his interest.
He is very much aware that the frenetic, restless pace of
development for which he is largely responsible has caused
internal tension between the demand for maintenance and
the desire for development. He would like to think that
the regional sites are now close to operating at main-
tenance level, making it easier to integrate new elements,
although he is aware that this does not always happen
easily. He concedes that he interprets the desire on the
part of some staff to stabilize the existing operation as
a conservative trend which he resists. While he is sen-
1172
sitive to what he calls "community expectations of CCV,"
he remains intrigued with new possibilities which, if
72Ibid
.
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adopted, might confuse people as to GCV
' s nature and pur-
pose. He wants to improve the program in ways which ap-
pear different, even if they are not completely innovative.
He does not, however, want. to give the impression that he
is experimenting for its own sake with little of real sub-
stance happening as a result.
Smith is troubled by the "great man" myth surrounding
him, although he thinks this notion of leadership, based on
an individual source of dynamism has diminished. Still,
some staff suggested that they were not certain the organi-
zation would survive his departure. Though Smith feels
that GCV can now operate successfully and continue to grow
with a team approach utilizing more specialization, a trend
away from the "great man" approach is not yet fully evident
or completely felt by the staff.
It is possible that new leadership at this point
might bring greater stability to the organization, al-
though it would likely be at the expense of a certain flair
which Smith seems to infuse regularly into the organization.
Perhaps staff have remained too dependent upon Smith as the
main focus for direction, since his record has thus far
been so impressive. Peter Drucker has pointed out that an
organization develops a mind-set based on its initial suc-
cesses and is reluctant to change the ways in which it goes
about its business, assuming everything will continue to
work out reasonably well without any change.
If CCV is, in fact, a creature for Smith's self-
expression, then its vision may be no greater than that
of its leader. While this element may have provided GCV
with an auspicious beginning, it could ultimately prove
to be its greatest limitation.
While GCV might become better, it probably will not
become much larger, and it cannot generate unlimited re-
sources. It is now attempting to build a state-wide edu-
cational services network without substantial additional
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funds. The method it has chosen is franchising e
.g., by
contracting with other institutions or groups, CCV will be
able to extend all facets of its activities through the
resources of others. CCV is finally acknowledging that
it cannot be all things to all people; but it can enfran-
chise and, if necessary, train others to do what it can-
not do alone, thus broadening its range of services through-
out the state. In the past, Smith might have been inclined
toward empire—building
,
but he is now recognizing the need
to share clients and resources.
Another idea currently under consideration by CCV is
establishing learning assessment centers in various sec-
tions of the state, where any citizen could talk with a
counselor to assess life experiences, identify present edu-
cational needs, and determine the most useful process or
program for achieving that individual's particular learning
objectives . In this respect, CCV would serve a brokerage
function, matching a need to learn with a corresponding
talent to teach via an efficient, and highly personal,
mechanism
.
In contemplating any new possibilities, the College
is always plagued with the difficulty of serving a geo-
graphically dispersed population. The northeast counties'
inhabitants are too dispersed to be served by staff teams
located in the few population centers of 2,500 or more
which do exist; the southeastern section has population
centers of 5i000-10,000 along the Interstate 91 corridor,
but also has vast mountainous sections with many small ham-
lets that have only limited access to the larger towns. One
approach now being developed is based upon the concept of
"circuit riders" with one or two mobile counselors operating
out of centers located, in larger towns where staff teams
are based.
The existing learning resources and support functions
to teachers and students, as well as proposed projects
119
such as
-assessment of learning and franchising
,
are all ac-
tivities which GCV could combine into regional learning
centers with both resident and mobile staff. Small learning
centers featuring individualized programs, a variety of
day and evening courses, and academic counseling, infor-
mation, and referral could be maintained in population
centers of 5,000 or more. These facilities could serve
as drop-in centers for youths and adults who need a place
to study outside the home, and as a place from which field
programs could be coordinated and regional staff trained.
In most cases, these centers could be run cooperatively
with other local social and educational programs.
Such arrangements, however, require planning, nego-
tiation, monitoring, communication, etc.—all tasks which
naturally fall to site staff. Without additional person-
nel to develop such contracts, the daily maintenance tasks
of student and teacher support may well suffer if site
staff are detailed to generate new business for the pro-
gram. This will only exacerbate the tension between cen-
tral and site staffs and the stabilization-innovation
dichotomy. Rapid success and constant growth has brought
with it the strains of adjustment to each new stage of
development with little opportunity to stabilize the oper-
ation at any level for a prolonged period of time. It has
only been recently, with its affiliation with the state
college system, that GCV shows some signs of institution-
alization. This liaison could limit GCV's flexibility.
Yet, the kinetic energy which characterizes Smith
currently shows little sign of diminishing. He now for-
sees a new burst of development for the program, and he
readily admits that it is the lure of new directions which
maintains his enthusiasm. The obvious course of action is
statewide expansion, but there are problems with this seem-
ingly easy way to grow. First, there is the potential for
awkward competition with existing colleges in southwestern
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Vermont. Also, expansion would be primarily a matter of
ab i li t y ol what now exists in southeastern and central
Vermont and probably would not offer Omith much opportunity
to pioneer new approaches.
The second option is to try something entirely new,
but Smith is now less willing to experiment just for the
sake of innovation. He recognizes that CGV has been an
unlikely experiment which has been unusually successful,
and he does not want to mar that record with any major
failures at this point. He also is well aware that CCV
cannot be all things to all Vermonters, and that only li-
mited elements can be blended before the program becomes
a catch-all for anything which appears non-tradit ional
.
It is exceedingly difficult to satisfy everyone, as
an outside funding source may be interested only in sup-
porting very innovative approaches, while local sources
may insist upon a much more traditional profile. There
is also a need to prove effective in serving specific popu-
lations without appearing to be too closely identified with
that population at the exclusion of others. Conflicts may
arise, for example, between the ideal of open access vs.
focused programs to meet the special needs of narrowly de-
fined populations.
Donald Schon underscores this difficulty of snythe-
sizing an innovative concept with conflicting demands when
he says
:
For those who operate under a revolutionary
paradigm in a particular community, there must
be a theory of community that connects it to
the paradigm and its elements must be iden-
tified within the community. Otherwise, the
paradigm cannot engage the community situa-
tion and has no potency regardless of how
strongly ideas are held./'5
^'Schon, Beyond the Stable State , p. 135-
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Many of those interviewed in the course of this study
who were instrumental in the early stages of the College's
development are concerned that it is now becoming increas-
ingly entrenched as a part of the state's higher education
bureaucracy. They see the College at a crucial point where
it can lose its innovating initiative, and settle into a
complacent and safe position within the system; or it can
maintain its early vigor, and keep at the thankless task
of shaking up existing educational systems.
Others, however, complain that after three years,
CCV still seems to be experimental, operating as if- it had
fto history to remind it of its past successes and failures.
This perpetual state of newness can also be a convenient
excuse for not willingly assuming responsibility for mis-
takes when, after all, the program is still in its incip-
ient stage. No doubt there have been the same pressures
placed upon this program as are placed upon various other
programs that depend upon external funding; i.e., to dem-
onstrate a need and a demand for promised services and to
respond to these in still more innovative ways, in order
to justify continued existence and future funding.
Some observers suggest that Smith and. the College
now may be beginning to outlive their usefulness and it
is now time for something entirely new to replace them.
They argue that already the Department of Education is
taking a hard look at its own traditional programs and is
becoming aware that these are not sacrosanct. Others
sense that the state colleges are now showing signs of
interest in the more orthodox programs of the Community
College and will incorporate these into their existing
programs, leaving the College free to go on to pioneer
new approaches which might eventually be replicated.
Others feel that the College now has a proven product and
process which should be expanded throughout the rest of the
state.
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Because the CCV proposal offered a fresh and flexi-
ble new approach, without tradition and guidelines, and
because existing higher education programs in the state
were so inadequate and limited by the staleness and in-
flexibility that can accompany tradition and guidelines,
it was instantly received. CCV was able to avoid arbi-
trarily established standards, yet gain respectability
and acceptance as a force to be reckoned with. It re-
mains to be seen whether the accumulation of credits and
degrees willultimately limit its flexibility and rob GGV
of its uniqueness.
In any case, there will always remain a need for its
unique, and perhaps its most enduring, aspect; i.e., its
presence in many small towns. As long as the College does
not become more preoccupied with protecting what it has
created than continuing to create, it is likely to con-
tinue to pla:/- a unique educational role. Harvey Scribner
suggests that when, and if, GGV loses its separate and
unique character, then another entrepeneur would be needed
HLy
to replace CCV. Nevit Sanford, in considering the pros-
pects for experimental colleges to remain impervious to
the processes of institutional strangulation of change,
argues that whole experiments, however rational or success-
ful, should be started over again every few years utilizing
75the accumulated wisdom of experience.
But, as everywhere else, the economics of higher
education has exacerbated the internicene battle among
institutions in Vermont. Ironically, just at the point
where CGV could capitalize on its earlier political
^Interview with Scribner, March 15, 1975.
^Sanford, The American College , p. 1,000.
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victories to gain the rapport with state colleges necessary
to maximize its impact on them, CGV has suddenly become
extremely vulnerable as the economic battle lines are
drawn. As the costs of higher education increase and the
traditional sources of support are either unwilling or
incapable of responding to the increased need to meet the
demand, then the decision-makers will rely less on educa-
tional information and more upon financial data to deter-
mine who can deliver equivalent servides at less cost than
traditional institutions. If new institutions like GCV
cannot respond with convincing evidence to these cost-bene-
fit issues, the friends they have won with their new educa-
tional and organizational approaches may be forced to aban-
don them.
The Impact of Innovation
At some point soon, the State of Vermont will have
to decide whether CGV will continue as a separate and dis-
tinct entity within the state higher education system, or
whether its functions can be absorbed by establishing a
community college component within existing state insti-
tutions. Vermonters have a need to feel roots, and it may
be that GGV will experience some pressure to establish
greater institutional identity than it has thus far. If
it does, GGV may become absorbed by its institutional role;
if not, the College may be seen as too transient ever to
be accepted in a state which considers anything foreign un-
less it has been present for two hundred years or more.
CGV wants to carve out and preserve for itself the
unique role of a statewide community college whose prime
service is to facilitate comprehensive learning and cre-
dentialing for anyone anywhere. To do this, an equal
but somewhat separate status must be maintained so that
it is sufficiently autonomous to respond and move in
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directions which distinguish it from its more restricted
sister institutions. With the entire state college sys-
tem in deepening financial trouble, a merger between CCV
,
the other state colleges, and the University may be in-
evitable, and could very well affect the Community Col-
lege's organizational style.
Predictably, the state colleges will claim they
can, and are, launching similar programs to provide off-
campus education to new adult populations. The difference
(and it is an all-important one) is that they will pre-
scribe their off-campus services using traditional on-
campus formulas. CCV will argue, in turn, that it would
be inefficient to train and gear up state colleges to do
what it has taken CCV three to four years to learn to do
well. Besides, they can point out that CCV serves as a
useful feeder program to the state colleges and this
division of labor should be maintained for maximum im-
pact on the problem of access.
The question of CCV's ultimate impact on higher edu-
cation in Vermont and elsewhere is a complex issue. As
CCV evolves into a form which approximates more familiar
educational systems, it can be viewed as an entropic
process, preserving less of its former pristine self,
but also developing increased leverage on established sys-
tems by its proximity and interaction with them.
In another five years, higher education in Vermont
will probably have a number of noticeable new features
(e.g., external degree components within existing institu-
tions); to what extent new developments will be traced to
CCV's pioneering efforts is difficult to ascertain. Cer-
tainly, its success will make it a more appealing model
to emulate, but its particular impact will, of course, be
difficult to distinguish or isolate from other local and
national developments in education.
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CCV s immediate future and ultimate impact is not, in
many respects, very much within its control. Vermont has no
clearly articulated public policy, neither in education nor
m any other area (except perhaps for environmental quality);
as a result, programs flourish or atrophy solely on the
basis of budgetary considerations. Clearly the currently
economic climate will .jeopardize any program that is rela-
tively new, no matter how impressive its record may be. In
times of economic austerity, the longer the tradition, the
greater the likelihood of preservation.
When Chancellor Craig presents his request for higher
education funds (of which an increasingly larger percentage
each year is allocated for CCV), the state legislature will
inevitably inquire whether the campus-based institutions
can do the same job that CCV is supposedly doing. The
truth is that the campuses can. perform some of the same
lunctions il they choose "to, and many will likely attempt
similar efforts, but they can only serve a very localized
population, leaving vast areas of the state still in need
of more mobile forms of higher education. Several of the
state colleges have, in fact, become more community minded,
but they are financially limited in implementing the Com-
munity College concept in any substantial way. Despite some
activity, the state colleges will continue to play a dis-
tinctly parochial, campus-oriented role.
A most exciting prospect is for an integrated state-
wide external degree system through a consortium effort
of CCV, Continuing Education, Extension Education, and Vo-
cational Education. It is in meeting the need for career-
oriented education in Vermont, without sacrificing the op-
portunity for exposure to academic disciplines, that CCV
can perhaps play a continuing leadership role.
^bCCV has more full-time equivalent Vermonters as
students (approximately 750) than Vermont's state colleges
who have increasingly higher percentages of out-of-state
students and noticeably few resident lower income students.
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While the state colleges may not fully appreciate the
CCV process of education, they have nonetheless already
been affected by its product. A number of two-year gradu-
ates have enrolled at the state colleges and nearly all
are doing remarkably well. 77 Most of these institutions
are gradually accepting the validity of competency-based
education and some are even moving toward it themselves.
Now that they see that much of what CCV does is gaining
both local and national prominence, they may well claim
they can, and are, doing the same things.
While its full impact upon other state educational
institutions is too early to discern after only three
years, there already are indications that its presence is
formidable enough to cause some discomfort within the edu-
cational establishment. Even some of its early supporters
within the academic community now wonder if perhaps they
too readily nurtured a stepchild who suddenly seems to
have developed a voracious appetite for increasingly scarce
state resources.
Increasingly, the state colleges will probably try
to replicate the approaches of CCV, but it is doubtful
that they have either the will or the capability to realize
much success. One former staff member suggested that it
takes a very special kind of talent and set of skills to
go into the towns of this state and actually start an
entirely new institution. It is something which simply
cannot be duplicated by existing institutions. Indeed,
the chemistry from which CCV was once created might not
be operating,- in its favor if the experiment were tried today.
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113,200. Interview with William Craig, February 14, 1970.
77The gradepoint average of CCV graduates currently
enrolled in Vermont state colleges is 0.7. CCV Annual Re -
port— 1974, p. 10.
Some Thoughts on the Community-Based Model
CCV's struggle to gain acceptance has had a strong
political, as well as an intellectual dimension; as a new
idea, it had to tap the sources of power to gain legiti-
macy as a concept and finally emerge as en integral en-
tity within the social-political system to which it as-
pired. Rogers and ohoemaker provide an interesting
clue as to why CCV has been relatively successful in eli-
citing favorable response from the state's educational
legislative establishment. "Perhaps change agents
should seek to provide their clients with a more favor-
able attitude towards new ideas and spend fewer efforts
in campaigns to secure the adoption of single innovations."^^
John Gardner takes note of this same phenomenon in saying
that "the essential catalyst .to assemble the revolution is
not any one of the pieces, but something which transcends
ROthe separate elements—the idea of reform itself."
In the fashion typical of anti-institutional inno-
vations, the Community College of Vermont exists today,
not so much because it knew what it wanted, but because, like
UWW, it knew what it did not want. CCV has always found
it easier to define itself in terms of negatives (e.g., not
campus-based), rather than stating precisely what it is.
The usual consequence of defining oneself in terms of the
competition is that success must then be defined in terms
relative to that competition, rather than in relation to
self-determined goals or standards of quality. But CCV
has managed to cultivate a distinct institutional image
without doing it at the expense of others.
^®See Schon, Beyond the Stable State , p. 139, for
a discussion of this process.
^Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innova-
tions
,
p. 281.
80Gardner, Self-Renewal , p. 218.
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GGV's separateness and independence has made it unique
yet, at the same time, vulnerable. The flexibility it en-
joys allows it the freedom to succeed or fail on its own
merits, to act on its own best judgements and accept the
consequences. Instead of a parent institution to rely
upon, CCV has the benefit of the energy and diversity of
several key people with political influence and commit-
ment. The presence of key leaders (such as Smith on the
inside and Craig on the outside) is crucial to the pro-
gram's success. Also, the quality controls GGV imposes
upon itself maintains its credibility in the eyes of
those skeptical of its ability to maintain academic pro-
priety outside the framework of a larger higher education
system. By quickly establishing itself as a self-sufficient
and self-contained educational enterprise, the state was
forced to accept or reject GGV in whole, rather than weaken
it in part
.
The emergence of an innovation is essentially a pro-
cess which flows from initiation to fulfillment. Burton
Clark, in elucidating his concept of the organizational
saga in higher education, sees evidence of fulfillment
when a new organization can arise quickly in a relatively
unstructured social setting and transform its purposes in-
to a credible story of unique accomplishment. Such a
successful exploit must assume some formality embodied
in organizational practices, possess strong normative
bonds within and outside the organization, and introduce
its purpose through an individual or small group with a
distinct mission. Working through the image it creates
for itself and for its public, the organization's members
develop a powerful sense of unity that gives the organiza-
tion a self-fulfilling momentum leading to the stage of
unique accomplishment that Clark recognized as an "or-
, „81ganizational saga.
^Clark, "Organizat ional Saga in Higher Education,"
Administrative Science Quarterly (Vol. 1?, No. 2, June
1972), pp. 178-83“.
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CCV s approach appears to have been one of asser-
tive action tempered by reflection, negotiation, and com-
promise. Its success can be attributed to the following
factors: Its conceivers possessed both conceptual clarity
and competency to implement their ideas; they were astute
enough to maintain contact with the political environment;
they developed relatively sophisticated systems for ac-
quiring and utilizing data; they displayed at least as
much accountability as more traditional institutions; and
they were both eclectic and selective in their growth as
needs arose.
The program's history to date can perhaps be best
described as a combination of consciously determined ac-
tions as well as fortuitious events and opportunities.
Unlike many of its contemporaries, CCV has been able to
effectively respond to many external variables through
compromise, circumvention, and accommodation, even if,
at times, it has been at the expense of its more pristine
character. It has been able to change the focus of its
educational program to meet the changing needs of students
and the changing social and political climate. By ad-
justing to institutional goals to accommodate clients'
needs and to modify the curriculum to changing issues,
CCV has remained a viable experiment in adult education.
Because CCV recognized the need to institutionalize
its means without institutionalizing its ends, it has
maintained an effective offensive strategy. A group of
talented people, attracted not by what was, but by what
could be, collaborated on a similar idea, though with
different needs and expectations. The result was a pro-
gram rather than a protest. And, as a result of this ap-
proach, CCV today finds itself in a favorable position to
promote movement toward what it sees as an ideal system
of higher education for Vermont: a statewide network of
learning services comprised of all existing institutional
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and community resources in education that would be accessi-
ble to any citizen at all levels from pre-associate decree
study to post-doctoral degree study.
While it may be true, as the research of Riesman and
Jencks suggests, that residential community colleges do
little to alter the habits and attitudes of their students
or to affect the status quo, the Community College of Ver-
mont's non—campus model may offer greater promise for fu-
ture innovation in academic theory and practice in adult
education. This is not to suggest that CCV is providing
an alternative route to success for its students, that
the potential for universal higher education is suddenly
enhanced by its presence, or that more programs like CCV
will necessarily contribute to the emergence of an egali-
tarian, classless society.
In fact, it can be questioned whether the Community
College has really provided its citizens with all the so-
cial and educational benefits it initially purported to
bring in a manner unique to what was previously available.
If the few options for access to post-secondary education
in Vermont, even with the presence of this new college,
provide essentially the same product to the same clientele,
then the Community College has not, in the final analysis,
provided any real alternative. The institution has, to
some extent, led a "Jekyll and Hyde" existence, en,joying
political and financial success while falling short of
achieving all of its ambitious social and educational
goals, and evolving toward what some of its early critics
perceived it would become—Vermont's fifth state college.
And yet
,
having achieved some measure of apparent
success, graduated nearly 100 students, received con-
sistently favorable reviews, and acquired a good measure
of political and economic security, it is quite pos-
sible that the Community College of Vermont is only now
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in a position to be able to invest confidently in its
surlier rhetoric and become an even more effective service
for those Vermonters who aspire to meaningful educational
experiences previously unavailable to the. David Kinsey
sums up CCV ' s history well in saying:
The CCV model builds upon the American tradition
of community colleges and the more recent edu-
cational innovations of contract learning and
competency-based creditation. But the way it
has applied these concepts to the common needs
that face an open learning system and the par-
ticular conditions of Vermont represent a sig-
nificant innovation in its own right. The re-
sult is a post-secondary educational program
with lower costs and a greater degree of social
justice for a dispersed, underprivileged popula-
tion not served by conventional education than
is the case in most other efforts. While there
is an emphasis on meeting individual needs for
self-improvement, a number of development re-
quirements of the society as a whole are also
served. CCV relieves the pressure for initial
entry into regular, post-secondary institutions;
provides needed skills on the para-professional
level; and facilitates the coordination or mo-
bilization of existing resources. 82
It still remains to be seen whether the Community
College of Vermont can avoid the fate of too many other
well-intentioned, but ill-conceived educational alterna-
tives from which too much was promised and too little was
received. The prognosis, on the whole, is encouraging.
^Kinsey, "Case of the Community College of Vermont"
( Conclusion)
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has attempted to identify two prevalent
models in the development of non-traditional
,
post-second-
ary education since the early 1960s. The first of these
has been characterized as an institutionally-based model
in which new programs were initiated as sub-systems of
larger
,
established institutions of higher education; the
second model is a community-based approach represented by
innovations initiated apart from the conventional educa-
tional systems from which they sought to deviate.
Summary of Study
Following a review of literature and a discussion
of both theoretical and practical questions surrounding
educational innovation, the study identified a number of
significant social, political, and economic implications
for the organizational growth of these archetypical pro-
grams, noting the particular effects on development of each
setting— institutional and communal.
Specific case analyses were then presented to illus-
trate factors promoting and inhibiting change in each case.
The University Without Walls at the University of Massa-
chusetts, Amherst, was seen as an example of the typical
campus-based, post-secondary innovation sponsored by a
parent institution. The Community College of Vermont was
then turned to as a current example of a non-campus ap-
proach to providing learning services to rural Vermonters
through the creation of an entirely new institution.
The comparative case studies in this study have sug-
gested that, while the University Without Walls was ul-
timately constrained by the institution of which it was a
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part, the Community College of Vermont was able to estab-
lish for itself a unique role distinct from the prevailing
system of higher education surrounding it before becoming
a part of that system.
Conclusions
1. The cases analyzed reinforce the literature which
suggests that the achievement of significant educational in-
novation is more likely to take place on the periphery of
higher education (i.e., in community or non-inst itutional
settings) rather than in colleges and universities them-
selves. Innovations which are part and product of in-
herently conservative, and often elitist, institutions are,
of necessity, limited to relatively small and insignificant
experimentation with new social and educational approaches.
As such, these new programs too often run the risk of ex-
tending the very methods that they presumably wish to
abolish or reform.
Those innovative programs sponsored within a larger
educational institution must ultimately become institu-
tionalized themselves if they wish to coexist in mutual
interdependence with the parent institution. In this way,
participants within such programs become, in fact, inmates
of the parent institution, confined to parameters of action
and ideas determined by the walls that encompass them.
Kerr advocates external reform with his conviction
that "change comes more from spawning something new than
reforming something old."^ Lon Hefferlin concludes the
same; "the sources of academic reform are primarily ex-
2
ternal to the academic system."
2. This study has also emphasized that the accep-
tance of innovation is an inherently political process.
1 Glark Kerr, Uses of the University (New York, 1965),
p. 102.
?Lon Hefferlin, Dynamics, o f Academic Reform, p. 142.
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Most effective strategies reflect an approach based on
response to events as they occur, negotiating and com-
promising to accommodate external forces, making tenta-
tive commitments and decisions, taking calculated risks,
testing ideas, and finally insinuating them into the main-
stream of support appears to be sufficient to allow a
reasonable chance for survival. Conviction of action must
be balanced by a certain tentativeness in planning so that
neither the course or obstacles to it are taken so seriously
that they obscure the reform that is desired.
It appears that a small core group can work, together
and gain approval for something new as long as it is pro-
vocative enough to inspire people to support it, but not
overly threatening or bizarre as to be immediately dis-
missed or thwarted. Reform efforts held together by a
sense of community structured to promote educational in-
novation rather than preserve academic dogma involve high
risks, but ultimately gains can be achieved.
3- No one element emerges as entirely sufficient by
itself to ensure successful educational reform. Further-
more, it is difficult to identify and predict those factors
contributing to successful innovation and separate these
from the particular history of each program. An entire
network of related factors must be present in sufficient
number to ensure some likelihood of success, and many con-
ditions may be identified as prerequisites for the success-
ful initiation of innovation.
Students of change tend to think of causation in
unique or personal terms, and not systematically. No uni-
versal principles emerge to account, for example, for dra-
matic reform in one institution and its total absence in
another. In addition, we have not identified very accur-
ately the actual causes of reform from its sources, ex-
cept to conclude that the sources of academic reform are
primarily external to the established educational system.
Rhetorical objectives must be complemented by some commen-
surate means to operationalize those goals and by an aware-
ness of the obstacles likely to be encountered. Without
some cognizance of the determinants which dictate what an
organization can and cannot be, there is no reality into
which reform can be introduced. Ideas must be tested in
real situations with knowledge gained from successes and
failures and used in turn as leverage for further change.
Effective reform must proceed a step at a time and no steD
is ever final. George Orwell once observed that "Every
revolutionary opinion draws strength from a secret con-
viction that nothing can be changed."
4. Appropriate organizational mechanisms must ac-
company individual activist attitudes if real change is
to occur. To know what techniques to employ, what con-
sequences to anticipate, and what constitutes a realistic
perspective from which to judge results, requires a clarity
of theory and knowledge derived from experience. Without
built-in mechanisms for recognizing and responding promptly
to problems, an organization becomes differentiated, and
its overall purposes become secondary to its component
parts that need solutions to feel a sense of success and,
in some cases, to survive.
If the dreams and designs of innovators and decision-
makers are not followed through and field tested by staff
willing to take on the primary role of doers and maintainers,
then discontinuity results between the planning and imple-
mentation phases. If the organization does not provide
avenues for broad-based impact to the decision-makers from
the doers, then the latter stop being creative and the for-
mer stop being responsive. Such is the fate of the organi-
zation which, while concerned about its external relations
and what it does for others, fails to view what it must do
for itself and its own members.
^Sarason
,
The Creation of Settings , p. 139*
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Without organizational self-awareness and self-dis-
the democratic liberty that produces restless
activity, force, and energy results in far less change
than should be stimulated. As Marris and Rein conclude,
"A hundred flowers flourish, but they do not make a gar-
den." 4
5* Innovation, like growth, can become its own ob-
ject, without form, direction, or plan; and an organiza-
tion's goals can assume a causality of their own if, in
the desire to make certain means are taken care of, the
ends (to which means are intended to contribute) are ob-
fuscated. Once the implementation process has begun, an
organization's original objectives are too often over-
ridden by considerations of power and growth for their
own sake, rather than the realization of the original ob-
jective. The usual result of this process, once intensi-
fied, is that the innovation begins, at times unconsciously,
to assume the same character as that of the larger system
from which it seeks to distinguish itself. The aim of in-
novation is, after all, to bring about desirable consequences
among those for whom it is intended, not simply adoption of
the innovation per se . ^ Perhaps this is why we are now ex-
periencing a time of great innovation in education, but
very little change!
6. Colleges and universities, as well as other edu-
cational institutions, if they are at all serious in re-
sponding to the numerous challenges for reform and rele-
vance, must reduce the discrepancy between what they say
they are doing and what they actually are doing. They
must be honest with themselves, their students, staff,
faculty, and the public. They must, in short, not be
content to merely pay lip service to the platitudes of
4Marris and Rein, Dilemmas , p. 237*
^Rogers and Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations ,
p. 322.
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commissions calling for "quality and diversity, social jus-
tice, constructive change, effective governance, and better
use oi resources." Phrases such as these are meaningless
in the abstract and can only have significance if compe-
tent people with institutional backing can transform goals
into practical programs.
But educational institutions that aspire to safe and
effortless change to avoid potential conflicts do not dis-
tinguish themselves as instruments of reform aimed at
serving the interests of students; more often, they react
reluctantly to external forces which demand polite responses
and then only when it is in their self-interest to do so.
The net result is that many institutions placate their stu-
dents and their communities with cautious and limited re-
forms while, at the same time, they urge more fundamental
change in higher education.
7. A choice exists for those who have, or think
they have, the resources to effect change—temporary edu-
cational experimentation from within our institutions or
deliberate movement toward more permanent changes along
the borders of our institutions where there may be higher
gains and there always are higher risks. It is people
who must make ideas work to accomplish stated goals, and
making things work in communities or organizations requires
knowledge of the social and political dynamics that are op-
erant and an ability to deal with them. But how the cli-
mate for change is to come about is not so clear, and there
are few impressive models to emulate. Whatever the locus
or mechanism, change within any setting is not likely to
be free of conflict with the larger system.
8. What may be demonstrated, in the final analysis,
is not that the non-traditional approaches , with which we
have been concerned in this study, have so much to recom-
mend as an alternative system (because there is obviously
much at fault with them, too), but that the conventional
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system, as Samuel Baskin observes, has so little to recom-
mend its continuance It may be that the so-called "in-
novative" movement in education, as in other realms of
American life and thought, existed merely as an era when
well-intentioned reforms were presumed to have occurred,
but well-entrenched traditions and values usually prevailed,
Recommendations for Further Study
TBis study has limited itself to a brief organiza-
tional analysis of the first three years of a special
higher education program within a state university, and to
a more detailed examination of a non-campus, community-
based, post-secondary program in rural Vermont during its
initial three-year history. With respect to the former
program, further research might well be focused upon a
comparative study of several University Without Walls
units that are either institutionally—based or community-
based to discern similarities and differences in their re-
spective organizational development.
Because considerable attention was given to the prob-
able future and potential impact of the Community College
of Vermont, a useful study could perhaps be undertaken
following an additional three-year period of the College's
existence to ascertain what factors have been significant
to its further development beyond those considered in the
current study. Also, an assessment of other community edu-
cation projects which are contemporaries of CCV should be
attempted at some point for the purpose of determining if
similar growth factors in other community settings result
in noticeably different outcomes. Most case studies to
date have focused upon successes and failures (mostly the
latter) of campus-based educational innovations.
6Baskin, Some Newer Developments in Higher Educa-
tion
,
p. 67
•
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More also needs to be done in developing a useful
educational change model which, in addition to taking into
account factors relating to conditions for change (e.g.,
style of the innovator, complexities of the innovation,
and characteristics of the target population), can also
identify processes that can successfully expedite the dif-
fusion and dissemination of an innovation.
Whether change dynamics within higher education
closely parallel those in other social institutions has
not yet been satisfactorily determined, nor have factors
for successful changes, that are unique to educational
settings, yet been identified. Criteria for what con-
stitutes "successful" innovation and instruments for es-
tablishing their effectiveness have yet to be devised.
These are suggested areas for further research which will
be left for more ambitious projects beyond the scope of
this study.
appendix I
Interview Procedure and Questions
Nineteen interviews were conducted between Novem-
ber 15, 1974, and March $1, 1975- Most involved in-person
conversations with selected respondents, using the ques-
tions below to guide discussion and to elicit other use-
ful observations. No interviews were taped; notes were
taken and later expanded upon. In some instances, inter-
views were conducted via telephone; this approach in no
way limited the effectiveness of the interview procedure.
Respondents were encouraged to be as candid and thorough
as possible and were assured that data gathered was not
for evaluative purposes.
1. Please describe chronologically your relationship/
involvement with GCV from its beginning to the present.
2. How would you characterize GCV ' s development? Have
there been distinct stages in its history? Describe.
Was its evaluation based on any design or model that
you can identify?
5.
Please identify any external factors (social, politi-
cal, economic, others) that have facilitated or hin-
dered GGV ' s development.
4. Please identify any internal factors (leadership, or-
ganizational characteristics, others) that have been
stimulants or obstacles to GCV's growth.
5. Does CGV differ (and if so, how) from the other Ver-
mont state colleges? Do you think it should be sep-
arate from, or a part of, the state college system?
Why?
6. What do you consider to be GGV' s unique aspects as an
organization? Would you recommend any organizational
style or function for CGV that is different from its
current mode of operation?
7. What do you feel are GCV's most significant strengths
and accomplishments to date? Its worst failings or
weaknesses?
8. Please characterize CCV's predominant student popula-
tion. Is this an appropriate clientele? Explain.
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What do you understand to be CGV ' s basic purpose? Do
you feel it has met its goals? Would you suggest other
functions that it should serve?
10. Please indicate how your opinion has changed, if at all,
about CCV from its beginning to the present.
11. What thoughts or recommendations do you have about
GGV's future? What do you consider its impact to be
at this point, or likely to be in the future, on higher
education in Vermont?
12. Please offer any additional comments and observations
regarding GGV that you feel would be helpful in ob-
taining further insight into its development.
appendix II
List of Persons Interviewed
The individuals listed below were selected to repre-
sent a variety of perspectives of persons formerly or
currently associated with the Community College of Ver-
mont. In addition, approximately ten other persons, mostly
CCV students and staff, were informally interviewed in-
dividually or in small groups. Also, a taped address by
Harvey Scribner to the Vermont New Careers Conference
(summer 1970) was made available by Dr. Scribner.
1. Sister Elizabeth Candon; President, Trinity College;
Burlington, Vermont.
2. Nancy Chard; Teacher Support Staff, Brattleboro site,
Community College of Vermont.
3. William Craig; Chancellor, Vermont State Colleges.
4. Marsha Daker; Counselor, Brattleboro site, Community
College of Vermont.
5. Larry Daloz ; Coordinator, Learning Support Services,
Community College of Vermont.
6. Thomas Davis; Secretary of Human Services, State of
Vermont
.
7. Robert Fine; Former Coordinator of Counseling Ser-
vices, Community College of Vermont.
8. Steven Hochschild; Former Educational Planner, Com-
munity College of Vermont.
9. Penny Horowitz; Consultant in Teacher Training to
Community College of Vermont.
10. David Kinsey; Author of "Open Learning Systems: Case
of Community College of Vermont."
11. Charles Parker; Former Staff Member, Community College
of Vermont.
12. Harvey Scribner; Former Commissioner of Education,
State of Vermont.
13. Marion Taylor; Former Chairperson, Board of Educa-
tion, State of Vermont.
14. Peter Smith; President, Community College of Vermont.
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15. John Turner; Coordinator, Brattleboro site, Community
College of Vermont.
16. Marjorie Walker; Coordinator, Central Vermont site,
Community College of Vermont.
17. Allan Weiss; Deputy Commissioner of Education, State
of Vermont.
18. Timothy Welsh; Teacher Support Staff, Central Vermont
site, Community College of Vermont.
19. Thomas Yahn; Coordinator, Southeast Vermont site, Com-
munity College of Vermont.
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